Moral Development Theory: A Critique of Its Kantian Presuppositions

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Contemporary moral development theory follows pathways laid down in the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). For Kant, moral action consists of dutiful adherence to formal rules and has nothing to do with the pursuit of personal goals. Indeed, one can be sure that one’s action is moral only if it is done out of duty and goes against all of one’s “inclinations.” Some contemporary moral developmentalists (for instance, Kohlberg and Turiel) are formalists: they draw from Kant the conception of moral rules as universalizable categorical imperatives, recognizable by their formal features, that pertain to social issues. Others (e.g., Eisenberg) are altruists: they draw on Kant’s insistence that moral action is inherently self-sacrificial, though they also insist that moral acts be specifically motivated by the desire to benefit others. We subject both formalism and altruism to thorough critique. Both positions define the moral domain too narrowly, leaving out questions of private morality like being honest with oneself; they cannot accommodate other principled conceptions of morality, like eudaimonism, that reject their Kantian presuppositions; and they cannot answer the question “Why be moral?” Whether impersonal or anti-personal, they neglect the personal. We propose a character-based redefinition of the moral domain that reintegrates moral development with the development of the self and of values, taking advantage of the insights into these areas of development afforded by the interactivist framework. We conclude by describing the challenges that a truly adequate account of moral development will have to meet and the contributions that eudaimonism can make to meeting those challenges.

Moral development theory presumes that “morals are . . . exclusively other-
regarding, and never self-regarding” (Veatch, 1980, p. 219). It inherits this presumption from academic moral philosophy, where the exclusion of personal goals from morality is widely accepted as valid without further argument. For instance, “A world of Robinson Crusoes has no need for a morality and no use for one” (Baier, 1958, p. 215), or “although egoism is logically consistent . . ., it is incompatible with what we intuitively regard as the moral point of view. The significance of egoism philosophically is not as an alternative conception of right but as a challenge to any such conception” (Rawls, 1971, p. 136).

From this presumption that the pursuit of private goals lacks moral significance, conceptions of morality can be developed in two directions. The formalist approach emphasizes the claim that morality is relevant only to social issues. Formalist approaches take individual goals and preferences, considered nonmoral in themselves, and, by filtering them through formal constraints, derive moral rules that are held to be binding on our social behavior. The altruist approach refrains from formalizing but stresses the conviction that the pursuit of our personal goals has no moral worth. People are enjoined to perform duties that may conflict with their goals, especially self-sacrificial acts for the benefit of others. Both formalism and altruism stem from the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1785/1959), who was the first major advocate of ethical impersonalism and even anti-personalism—the rigid separation of morality from the pursuit of personal goals. And both are well represented in contemporary moral development research.

Influential though it might be in contemporary discourse, the philosophical basis from which moral development theorists have been working is dangerously narrow. Non-Kantian conceptions of morality have existed throughout history, are prevalent in other cultures, and continue to exist within our own. In this critique we will rely primarily on Aristotelian conceptions to illuminate the inadequacy of Kantianism as a foundation for the study of moral development. We chose them in part because of their uncompromising rejection of Kant’s impersonalism. In Aristotle’s view, the purpose of morality is to enable individuals to live the good life, to actualize their potentials as human beings, to achieve eudaimonia. Though eudaimonia is often translated as “happiness,” caution is required because happiness is often equated with mere satisfaction of desires. According to a contemporary definition, eudaimonia is “the feelings accompanying behavior in the direction of, and consistent with, one’s true potential” (Waterman, 1981). Present-day Aristotelians (Den Uyl, 1991; Rasmussen & Den Uyl, 1991) often use the phrase human flourishing. Although the social implications of the Aristotelian approach should not be neglected, it is primarily concerned with how to live one’s own life.

We will argue that the formalist variety of Kantianism has artificially restricted the range of moral problems studied and is incapable of explaining how non-Kantian forms of moral reasoning, conduct, or personality would develop. The altruist variety imposes its own artificial restrictions on the moral domain, ten-
dentiously downgrades nonaltruistic judgments as morally immature, and pro-
pounds a conception of “prosocial behavior” that is incoherent in theory and
dangerous in practice.

We begin with an account of Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy and its
legacy to contemporary moral development theory.

THE KANTIAN LEGACY

In content, Kant’s ethical system is a continuation of Christian religious teach-
ings, specifically those of 18th century Pietism, the accepted view in his time and
place. Kant did not consider himself an innovator in this respect; he assumed that
the ordinary person already knew that he or she had a duty to be honest, indus-
trious, charitable, truthful, and so forth. His innovation lay in his conception of
moral rules and their origin.

According to Kant (1785/1959, 1797/1991), the only moral acts are those done
out of duty. Such acts must be done, regardless of the circumstances or their
consequences for the actor and others, because they are inherently obligatory. By
contrast, acts done in pursuit of one’s own goals, acts done out of desire or
inclination, have no moral relevance or moral worth. The only time that one can
be sure that an act is done from duty, and hence is truly moral, is when the act
goes against one’s inclinations. “It is a duty to preserve one’s life, and moreover
everyone has a direct inclination to do so. But for that reason the often anxious
care which most men take of it has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim of so doing
has no moral import. . . . But if adversities and hopeless sorrow completely take
away the relish for life, if an unfortunate man, strong in soul, is indignant rather
than despondent or dejected over his fate and wishes for death, and yet preserves
his life without loving it and from neither inclination nor fear but from duty—
then his maxim has a moral import” (Kant, 1785/1959, pp. 397–398).

Parallel to the distinction between duty and inclination is Kant’s distinction
between two kinds of moral rules: categorical and hypothetical imperatives.
Hypothetical imperatives recommend actions as means to some goal: “If you
want to achieve X, you should do Y.” Prior to Kant, all moral systems consisted,
at least in part, of hypothetical imperatives. All specified some ultimate end for
human action, to which their rules were supposed to specify means. Greek
eudaimonism held that one ought to behave in certain ways to actualize one’s
potential as a human being. Christian morality was understood as conditions for
attaining eternal life in the afterworld and avoiding divine punishment. From
Kant’s standpoint, however, hypothetical imperatives cannot be moral, because
they would make moral behavior conditional on inclinations, on personal goals
and desires, on something empirical. He reserved special scorn for eudaimonism,
or “the principle of happiness” (Kant, 1797/1991, p. 378). “Empirical principles
are not at all suited to serve as the basis for moral laws . . . the principle of one’s
own happiness is the most objectionable of all . . . this principle supports morality
with incentives which undermine it and destroy all its sublimity, for it puts the
motives to virtue and those to vice in the same class, teaching us only to make a better calculation while obliterating the specific difference between them” (Kant, 1785/1959, p. 442). Hypothetical imperatives can be practical advice, or “counsels of prudence,” but not moral rules. In reducing prudence (practical wisdom, *phronesis*) to mere expedient calculation and thrusting it outside the moral domain, Kant brought about the final downfall of what for Aristotle was a central moral virtue (Den Uyl, 1991).

Only *categorical imperatives*, which are unconditional on the actor’s context or on the consequences of the act, can be commands to duty and therefore moral rules. Categorical imperatives have the form: “You must do X.” According to Kant, the crucial formal test for the moral relevance of a categorical imperative is whether it is *universalizable*. “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, 1785/1959, p. 421).

Kant distinguished sharply, too, between *autonomy* and *heteronomy* of the will. A moral system that makes moral rules conditional on anything except the individual’s will is said to be *heteronomous*. Heteronomous moralities include those that are based on external authority, on pleasing God, on obeying the State, on making others happy, or on not offending others. But, more broadly, they include any morality that recommends actions to achieve goals of any kind. Kant held that when a person pursues a goal, that person’s will is determined by natural causes and is therefore not truly autonomous. Truly *autonomous* morality is said to be based on one’s will making rules for itself, without regard for any natural cause at all (including final causes, or goals).

The “maxims” or rules of duty, starting with the basic categorical imperative, are imposed on each person by his or her will. Kant meant something very different by “will,” however, than we do in everyday usage. If the rules of duty were imposed by our own wills, we would have chosen them, would know that we had chosen them, and would consciously want to follow them. Of course, most of us have done no such thing.

Kant got around these difficulties by recourse to his distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The will as we know it, whether through introspection or through the data and arguments of empirical psychology, is merely the will as we experience it, the *phenomenal will*. The phenomenal will, like anything else in the world as we know it (the phenomenal world), is governed by natural causes. Yet moral rules, for Kant, cannot be conditional on natural causes. The will that commands us to duty is therefore not the will as we know it, the phenomenal will, but rather the will as it is in itself, apart from our means of knowing it, the *noumenal will*.

By denying that moral rules could have any “empirical” basis, including goals, Kant entangled himself in insuperable difficulties. Could the noumenal will actually *cause* anyone’s actions? In Kant’s epistemology, causality results from applying the categories of the understanding and pertains only to the phenomenal world, not to the noumenal world. By restricting himself to efficient causality, in
which one event causes another event, Kant gave a plausible basis to his Third Antinomy. The Antinomy is the supposedly paradoxical question of whether a series of events can have an absolute beginning, unconditional on any prior event. In the realm of human action, he claimed to avoid this quandary by bifurcating the will into phenomenal and noumenal components.

Our will as we understand it, the phenomenal will, is subject to the laws of efficient causality as imposed by our categories and consequently is not only determined by other empirical causes, but is subject to the infinite regress of the Third Antinomy. The will as it is in itself, the noumenal will, is out of time and beyond causality because the categories do not apply to it. Although this move exempts the noumenal will from the Third Antinomy, it does so at a steep price, because Kant also wanted to maintain that the noumenal will somehow affects our thought and behavior.¹

Kant tied himself in even tighter knots. Could there be such a thing as a noumenal will? Does each person have one or many? Or is there a single noumenal something-or-other of which our individual wills are mere manifestations? Unity, plurality, possibility, and reality are all categories, so only entities in the phenomenal world can be properly thought of as objects, or as singular or plural, as existing, or even as being possible. Inaccessible to the categories of the understanding, the noumenal will (to speak less tendentiously, the noumenal we-know-not-what) should, according to Kant’s own epistemology, be regarded as utterly unknowable, and the proper course would have been to maintain a respectful silence about it.

Critics like Nietzsche (1889/1968) and Rand (1964) have pointed out, however, that the noumenal will is indispensable to Kant precisely because there cannot be any evidence or argument for its existence, precisely because there can be no way of knowing what it is like. In Kant’s view we cannot avoid thinking in terms of “ideas of pure reason,” or making claims about noumenal entities, whose purported existence cannot be refuted because they are beyond the categories. From the critics’ standpoint, Kant has thrown up an obscurantist shield to protect Christian morality from rational criticism of Christian beliefs. The noumenal will, in Kant’s philosophy, shares its protection from rational examination with other sensitive concepts like those of God, freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul. “I have . . . found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith. The dogmatism of metaphysics . . . is the source of that unbelief, always very dogmatic, which wars against morality” (Kant, 1781/1965, p. B xxx).

Kant’s conception of an “autonomous” morality—that is, morality based on

¹ By attributing “freedom” to the noumenal will and determination by antecedent events to the phenomenal will, Kant offered a “defense” of free will that did it enormous damage, rendering it unintelligible and wholly outside the natural order. That is a topic for another discussion, however—as is Kant’s unduly narrow conception of causality.
the laws and commandments issued by the supposedly free noumenal will—also deserves a brief comment. Autonomy, as we normally speak of it in psychology, implies independence of mind and relying on one’s own resources (Petrovich, 1982). But contemporary psychology does not dichotomize the will into phenomenal and noumenal fragments. Unthinking obedience to external authority indicates a lack of autonomy, in Kant’s sense as well as the usual one. For Kant, basing one’s morality on one’s thoughts about human nature, on one’s own goals, on one’s conception of the good, or, indeed, on anything one knows (in Kant’s terms, anything “empirical” or phenomenal) also indicates a lack of autonomy (Lomasky, 1987; Peikoff, 1982; Taylor, 1985, 1989). Kantian autonomy really means obedience to an internal authority—not an individual conscience, but a thoroughly impersonal “agency.” It means submission to the causeless, causally inefficacious, atemporal, inscrutable, and incomprehensible demands of the noumenal will.

From Kant’s characterization of morality as duty, two major currents of thought have flowed: formalism and altruism. Formalism emphasizes Kant’s views about the formal nature of moral rules, rather than the content of his moral beliefs. Formalistic thinkers agree that personal goals are nonmoral and that moral rules must take the form of universalizable categorical imperatives that apply primarily to social relationships. Kantian formalism is currently popular, if not dominant, in academic moral philosophy and especially (given its restricted scope) in political philosophy; in the eyes of both its admirers (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983) and its detractors (Veatch, 1980) it is the contemporary “paradigm.” For instance, Rawls (1971) has attempted to justify the welfare state and redistributionism using a Kantian formalist procedure; Gewirth (1978) has sought to justify a somewhat different political order by a different formalist procedure; and Nozick (1974) has attempted to refute Rawls and justify a libertarian limited government without presenting an alternative moral framework.

Altruism derives more from Kant’s substantive moral views than from his formal theory. Kant believed that seeking one’s own happiness is not a morally appropriate goal, but that seeking the happiness of others is compelled by duty (1797/1991, pp. 385–387). From the altruistic point of view, moral acts are acts of self-sacrifice for the benefit of others.

It should be noted that Kant himself emphasized duty, self-denial, and resistance to temptation, rather than altruism, as the core of morality. Many of the duties he advocated (e.g., helping the needy at one’s own expense) were the same ones that altruists would insist on. But Kant’s conception of morality was not altruistic at root. From his standpoint, if the basis of morality were furthering the ends of others or making them happy that would still make moral rules conditional on someone’s goals. Obedience to the noumenal will was for Kant the only basis for moral acts, and he did not hesitate to claim the importance of duties to oneself, such as avoiding servile behavior or not stupefying oneself with food and drink (Kant, 1780/1930; 1787/1991). Of course, such duties can be called self-
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interested only to the extent that the noumenal self has interests. Though Kant
would occasionally claim knowledge of noumenal interests, as in his notorious
contention that the noumenal self seeks to develop its (noumenal?) talents to the
fullest rather than devote itself to “idleness, indulgence, and propagation” (Kant,
1785/1959, p. 423), appeals to noumenal interests are no more coherent than
appeals to noumenal causality, and modern Kantians have let “self-regarding
duties” fall by the wayside.

It was post-Kantian philosophers like Fichte, Hegel, and Comte who first
maintained that altruism was the essence of morality. To blaze a trail from Kant’s
impersonalism to full-blown altruism, they had to develop a form of metaphysi-
cal collectivism (reducing the individual to the social and subordinating the
individual to society), of which there are few traces in Kant’s own writings
(Peikoff, 1982).

Secular altruism is in any case a popular morality in our time and place—we
would argue the popular morality. Adherents of popular morality rarely devote
much thought to examining or justifying their position, because they take it for
granted. Consequently the altruists are less interested in or cognizant of moral
philosophy than the formalists, and neither Kant nor any other philosopher is
often cited in their writings. Nonetheless, the Kantian presupposition, that mo-
rality must never be self-regarding, governs their work.

FORMALISM

Kohlberg’s Account of Moral Development

The formalist approach became established in moral development research
through the pioneering works of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969, 1971, 1981; Colby,
Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1983; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983). Kohl-
berg consciously placed his own conception of morality in the Kantian formalist
tradition; he made extensive reference to Kant’s own work and to that of promi-
nent contemporary Kantians like Hare (1963), Baier (1958), Frankena (1973),
Rawls (1971), and Habermas (1979). Kohlberg was concerned primarily with the
kinds of conceptions of moral rules that people use, or their styles of moral
reasoning—not the specific rules they adopt or the specific judgments they make.
He used criteria of structure and form to judge the sophistication of instances of
moral reasoning and consequently to determine the developmental stage they
belonged to.

A particularly clear statement of these Kantian leanings is Kohlberg et al.’s
(1983) presentation of the metaethical assumptions that underlie their research
program. They claim that in order to make use of Kohlberg’s stages of moral
reasoning, psychologists must accept a list of assumptions about the nature of
morality. Such assumptions as prescriptivism, universalism, and principledness
are clearly Kantian—they are most centrally embodied in universalizable cat-
 egorical imperatives. Even more basic are the assumption of formalism and the
assumption of the primacy of justice (by which Kohlberg means legal or political justice). Formal principles of justice (fair procedures for balancing conflicting claims) are things all rational agents could agree on. By contrast, people disagree about what is good; therefore, conceptions of the good are bound to be “pluralistic” and therefore relative—hence they cannot serve as a basis for agreement.

Kohlberg’s conception of formalism perhaps deserves additional attention. Acknowledging that they have not always done so in the past, Kohlberg et al. (1983, pp. 81–82) distinguish ethical formalism, which “means a deontological [duty-based] ethic like Kant’s which says that rightness is only a matter of the universal form of the principle followed” from metaethical formalism, which is concerned with “the moral point of view.” But the moral point of view is itself to be characterized formally and impersonally. They quote Frankena, admiringly and at length: his conclusion is that “one is taking the moral point of view if and only if (a) one is making normative judgments about actions, desires, dispositions, intentions, motives, persons, or traits of character; (b) one is willing to universalize one’s judgments; (c) one’s reasons for one’s judgments consist of facts about what the things judged do to the lives of sentient beings in terms of promoting or distributing nonmoral good and evil; and (d) when the judgment is about oneself or one’s own actions, one’s reasons include such facts about what one’s own actions and dispositions do to the lives of other sentient beings as such, if others are affected” (1973, p. 114).

Kohlberg et al. (1983) do not regard their commitment to formalism as in any way controversial. They assert that “in this case of metaethical formalism, we know of no systematic statement of an opposed position” (p. 83). They go so far as to claim that “all these modern theorists [Rawls, Gewirth, Peters, Hare, Habermas, and others] can be characterized as postconventional in their form of reasoning. . . . In this sense there are formal similarities among these thinkers, despite content divergences. . . . While there is vigorous disagreement among philosophers about theory formulation, these disagreements exist within what could be called a common paradigm. In this paradigm of modern moral philosophy, basic assumptions are shared as to rigorous methods of argument.” Perhaps Kohlberg and his students have decided that such thinkers as Rand (1964), Norton (1976), Veatch (1962, 1971, 1980), Machan (1975), Lomasky (1987), Nussbaum (1986, 1990a), and Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991) do not count as moral philosophers—or that they are all bad philosophers, none of whom argues with sufficient rigor. But no such critique is to be found anywhere in the Kohlbergian corpus.

Appeals to authority are not, in Kohlberg’s own terms, characteristic of the most sophisticated sort of moral reasoning. A more thoughtful reply to questions about formalism, impersonalism, and restrictive conceptions of justice comes from the Kohlbergian James Rest (1983):

there is no evidence that the core notions and psychological processes related to social morality are the same as those relating to other values. It is true that conceptions of duty
and fairness are closely tied to conceptions of the “good” (an argument for not separating social morality from other questions of value); however, it is also true that conceptions of duty and fairness are closely tied to human life (Is a 2-month fetus a human life?), self (Is one person’s self bounded by his skin or does it include his children, work, interests?), rationality, society, and so on. Rather than taking up the whole network of interconnected thought, social morality will be delineated as a special domain. . . . (p. 617, n. 1)

We will revisit this question of defining the moral domain on a number of occasions, for it is fundamental to all debates about moral development.

Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral Development

Based on the formal character of reasoning about hypothetical moral dilemmas (problems which pit different values against one another and which can be resolved in more than one way), Kohlberg discerned a series of six structural stages of moral thought, consisting of three levels with two stages each. Development through these stages was thought to involve a progressive differentiation of moral rules from “prudential” considerations and from social conventions. In describing these stages, we will stick with the more familiar “ideal type” characterizations that Kohlberg (1969, 1971) gave in his earlier work. The later account, in terms of “sociomoral perspective” (Colby et al., 1983), seeks to purge the stage descriptions of every vestige of specific moral content. It has the practical consequence (a dubious one at best) of dispelling the appearance of regressions at the higher stages of moral development, but it also makes higher stages harder to attain.

At the preconventional level, neither moral rules nor social conventions are explicitly understood. In Stage 1, moral judgments are based on the physical consequences of actions for the actor. Avoidance of punishment and deference to authority are the criteria of good behavior. In Stage 2, moral judgments are based on what instrumentally satisfies one’s own needs. A pragmatic or hedonistic orientation prevails.

At the conventional level, the standard of value is conforming to the norms of one’s group and acting to maintain them. In Stage 3, moral judgments are based on pleasing others and living up to socially acceptable stereotypes. In Stage 4, maintenance of the social order and following fixed rules become the primary moral criteria.

Of special interest for us is Kohlberg’s conception of the most advanced stages of moral thought, once morality is firmly and explicitly distinguished from social convention, and the reasoner is able to adopt a perspective prior to society instead of taking a particular social order for granted. The first of these postconventional stages is Stage 5, characterized by a “social-contract legalistic” orientation. In this orientation there is an expressly utilitarian appeal to moral rules as socially agreed-on standards, needed for the useful or beneficial functioning of society and revisable by general agreement. Beyond the sphere of these consensual social
rules, morality is relegated to personal opinion and regarded as purely subjective and relative.

Kohlberg debatably takes Stage 5 reasoning to be characteristic of the United States Constitution and to be the standard foundation for the American legal system. (Debatably, because natural rights theories are widely regarded as the foundation for the American legal system, and as we shall see, many of them do not fit Stage 5 at all.) Stage 5 reasoning resembles political philosophy in the Kantian formalist tradition, with its view of personal values as nonmoral and relative and a framework for intersubjective agreement producing moral rules that govern social behavior. All it lacks is the explicit formal apparatus. The general features of Stage 5 would be familiar and congenial to Rawls (1971) or Habermas (1979).

Beyond Stage 5, Kohlberg posits a Stage 6 based on appeal to “universal ethical principles.” These principles of justice, equal rights, and respect for individual dignity are regarded as binding on everyone and immune to intersubjective revision. They are, however, intersubjective in origin, because they are the principles which any ideally rational agent with a fully equilibrated moral perspective would arrive at. They are not based on anything inherent in the cosmos or in human nature. What is distinctive about them is their abstract, formal features: logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These are Kantian criteria, and, as we might expect, Kohlberg regards the categorical imperative as a quintessentially Stage 6 moral principle.

Rawls (1971), whose work is frequently cited by Kohlberg (1981; Kohlberg et al., 1983) as an exemplar of Stage 6 reasoning, employs a Kantian variant of the social contract approach to justify the welfare state. In Rawls’ approach, everyone must choose political principles in the “original position,” without knowledge of his or her own interests and without any preconceptions about the good [Kohlberg also approvingly cites Habermas’ (1979) related conception of a “community of dialogue”).

Stage 6 is primarily of interest as an indication of Kohlberg’s ideal moral orientation, because by all accounts it is extremely rare. Whereas Stage 5 (even under the later, stricter scoring system) is found to some degree in well-educated adults in Western societies, Stage 6 was ultimately left out of the scoring system altogether (Colby et al., 1983). To be at Stage 6, one would have to be a philosopher-king. Nonetheless, it indicates what Kohlberg regards as the best and most advanced form of moral thought, the telos of moral development. Through all of its vicissitudes, Kohlberg (1981; Kohlberg et al., 1983; Kohlberg, Boyd, & Levine, 1990) never stopped maintaining that his structural stage sequence had to be defined as a progression toward Stage 6.

Narrowness of the Moral Domain

Not only are Kohlberg’s higher stages expressly Kantian in character, but the
range of issues on which he assessed moral reasoning is exceedingly narrow. The most frequently used version of Kohlberg’s moral judgment interview, Form A, presents three dilemmas: (1) Whether Heinz should steal a prohibitively expensive drug needed to save his wife from a fatal illness; (2) whether a judge should be lenient with Heinz after Heinz steals the drug; and (3) whether Joe’s father should violate a prior agreement by telling Joe how to spend his money (Colby et al., 1983).

Because of the intensive probing required by Kohlberg’s style of interviewing, only a few dilemmas can be presented. The same narrowness of scope is apparent, however, on less intensive measures. Rest’s (1979) Defining Issues Test is a standardized assessment of Kohlberg’s stages that correlates well with performance on Kohlberg’s own dilemmas (at least under the older, ideal-type stage definitions). Persons taking the Defining Issues Test rank a preselected set of considerations about each dilemma in order of importance; on this basis, their reasoning is classified as predominantly conventional (Stages 3 or 4) or post-conventional (Stages 5 or 6). There are six dilemmas: (1) the Heinz dilemma; (2) whether to turn in an escaped convict who has concealed his past and become a solid citizen; (3) whether or not to hire a minority worker in a racially prejudiced community; (4) how the administration of a college should respond to the takeover of a building by a New Left group; (5) whether the principal of a high school should suppress a student newspaper that printed an editorial attacking school policies; and (6) whether a doctor should kill a terminally ill patient at the patient’s request.

Except perhaps for Rest’s third problem (which deals in part with community attitudes), all of these dilemmas revolve around questions of rights and legal justice. There are no moral dilemmas in these collections about relying on one’s own thinking versus going along with the crowd, or putting one’s own goals first rather than resolving primarily to care for others, or being honest with oneself about a difficult or painful issue versus adopting a policy of self-deception. Although these are the primary moral conflicts of major works of fiction (among many examples, Ibsen, 1882/1958; Rand, 1943; Kesey, 1964), and they figure in many people’s lives, they are not included in Kohlberg’s or Rest’s moral dilemmas.

Nor are there moral questions about how we ought to relate to our feelings. If I feel angry at a friend should I view my anger as indicating some violation of my own integrity and values, and therefore as something to be listened to, articulated, and perhaps acted on? Or should I view my angry reaction as immature, self-centered and dangerous—indeed, best hidden or suppressed because of its potential to disrupt social harmony?

The Kohlbergian approach, then, restricts itself to a narrow domain of moral reasoning: so-called justice reasoning, in situations in which conflicting rights or moral claims have to be resolved or balanced. Formalism requires that morality
be other-regarding, so it shuffles off private values as relative and subjective. Formalism requires that moral principles be universal, categorical, and impersonal, so it ends up reducing morality to legal and political justice.

**Could Any Other Moral Conception Be Postconventional?**

A different kind of narrowness in Kohlberg’s approach is revealed by the existence of reasoned positions in moral philosophy that do not fit in any of his stages. Kohlberg repeatedly emphasized the universality of his hierarchy of stages. In consequence, any genuine moral position (at least, insofar as it bears on questions of political justice) should belong in one or more of them.

We will argue that the eudaimonic, Aristotelian position is a counterexample. A word about our multiple uses of eudaimonism may be appropriate here. Eudaimonism serves more than one purpose in this critique: (1) as an alternative conception of morality that some people come to hold, and, therefore, that any theory of moral development must be able to account for; (2) as a standpoint from which to challenge the moral and the psychological assumptions made by Kantian approaches; and (3) as an indication of a different approach to moral development, emphasizing the broader development of values and of the self or personality. We will endeavor to make clear, as we proceed, how we are using eudaimonism and will reconsider these multiple purposes when we contemplate how the study of moral development might look after it breaks out of its post-Kantian confines.

Some caution is required here, because the eudaimonistic tradition is old enough and complex enough to have developed in a number of different directions. Our understandings of ourselves, our self-interpretations, have changed since Aristotle formulated the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For Aristotle, the individual was always a citizen-in-a-polis-in-a-cosmos. A straightforward consequence was that Aristotle had no conception of rights that an individual might have not to be harmed by other members of the polis. (For that matter, Aristotle, like other Greek thinkers, accepted slavery as part of the social order and tried to justify it on the ground that some people are “natural slaves.”)

Some forms of modern eudaimonism carry forward Aristotle’s emphasis on the polis. Such approaches are communitarian, hostile to liberal individualism, and at best uncertain about individual rights (MacIntyre, 1981; Nussbaum, 1986, 1990a,b; Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Sullivan, 1986). They reject other key aspects of Aristotle’s ethics, such as his metaphysical biology and his conception of human goals, replacing them with a hermeneutic social ontology that views human beings as embedded within community, language, and tradition; MacIntyre and Nussbaum also draw to some extent on Marxist traditions.

But there is also a distinct liberal individualist strain in eudaimonism, one that retains (with minor modifications) Aristotle’s view of human goals (or “man’s natural end”) and integrates it with Lockean and post-Lockean conceptions of
individual rights. Exponents of individualist eudaimonism, like Rand (1964), Machan (1975), Norton (1976), Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991), Wheeler (1984), and, less puristically, Veatch (1962, 1971, 1985), are advocates of individual rights and evaluate the goodness of human societies on the basis of their respect for individual rights.

One might well ask whether the reasoning of contemporary liberal eudaimonists would qualify as postconventional. Despite their conceptions of rights, and their genuine prior-to-society perspective, such eudaimonistic conceptions do not belong in Stage 5. Theorists in this tradition consider rights to be objective, based on facts about human nature and the requirements of social existence, not the product of intersubjective agreement or considerations about maximizing social utility. Thus their thinking cannot be considered utilitarian. Nor is their thinking rooted in impersonal principles of a deontological or duty-based nature.

Perhaps we have aimed too low. Because they hold that rights are based on fundamental moral principles, we might wonder whether the reasoning of theorists like Rand, Norton, Den Uyl, and Rasmussen could be included in Kohlberg’s Stage 6. Stage 6 principles, however, are characterized by formal features: They are universalizable categorical imperatives. Stage 6 principles are wholly independent of the pursuit of private goals, or of conceptions of the good; they are not intended to answer the question, “Why be moral?” (Kohlberg, 1971, 1981; Kohlberg & Power, 1981).

By contrast, for eudaimonism, moral standards are hypothetical imperatives, means to an ultimate end appropriate for human beings, or instantiations of that end. Goals can be related to other goals instrumentally, as means to those goals; they can also be related to other goals by satisfying or instantiating them (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986). In eudaimonism, particularly individualist eudaimonism of the inclusive-end variety (Den Uyl, 1991; Rasmussen & Den Uyl, 1991) hypothetical imperatives may involve either instrumental and satisfaction relationships. From this perspective, eudaimonia or human flourishing can be instantiated in many different ways; different constellations of values are appropriate for different individuals, but this pluralism does not imply relativism. Moreover, the pursuit of any constellation of eudaimonic values needs to be self-directed, and the crucial importance of self-directedness is the basis for rights.

What distinguishes such principles is their ontological basis in a conception of human nature, not their formal features. Eudaimonic principles of political justice derive from more fundamental considerations about the good and from considerations about the need for morality in the first place. Eudaimonic conceptions of human rights and human dignity emerge from a framework radically different from anything in Kohlberg’s conception of Stage 6.

Moreover, Kohlberg, despite his professed interest in the structure of moral reasoning rather than specific norms or judgments, presumed general agreement among postconventional thinkers on the answers to moral dilemmas. For the
Heinz dilemma, Kohlberg, in his later writings, posits a rigid hierarchy that ranks the right to life of Heinz’s wife above the druggist’s property rights in the drug that he invented. All Stage 5 thinkers must conclude that human rights are more important than property rights and hence that Heinz would be justified in stealing the drug: “Whether someone is a Kantian deontologist or a utilitarian, they agree that it is right for Heinz to steal the drug, if they use postconventional reasoning” (Kohlberg et al., 1983, p. 108). Stage 6 involves completely equilibrated ideal role-taking, concerning all possible participants in the dilemma. According to Kohlberg (1981), all Stage 6 reasoners will be able to take each participant’s role without bias or egocentrism and so will come to the same conclusions about any dilemma, provided they understand the facts. In fact, Stage 6 reasoners will conclude that Heinz not only has a right to steal the drug, but that he has a duty to; what is more, he owes this duty impartially to anyone who needs the drug (friend, stranger, even his worst enemy)—not just someone he cares deeply for.

By contrast, eudaimonic natural rights philosophers like Rand (1964) and Norton (1976) would conclude that Heinz should not steal the drug. Rand considers persons to be morally inseparable from their justly acquired property (Den Uyl & Rasmussen, 1984b). Nozick (1974), whose conception of rights is not founded on a eudaimonic ethic, would also consider it wrong for Heinz to steal the drug: the fact that Heinz’s wife needed the drug would not justify using force to seize the druggist’s justly acquired property (see also Puka, 1990, who, although unsympathetic to Nozick’s politics, presses exactly this case against Kohlberg). Natural rights theorists would contend that property rights are human rights and that Heinz should not steal the drug, so they simply could not get rated at Stage 5 or 6. In eudaimonism, then, we have a clear moral position, with real advocates and practitioners, that is principled, that deals with questions of justice and rights, and that clearly distinguishes morality from social convention, but must be excluded from either of Kohlberg’s postconventional stages.

Eudaimonism is profoundly anomalous for Kohlberg’s account of moral thought. And it cannot be dismissed as a counterexample just because we have illustrated it by citing philosophers. Kohlberg (1971, 1981) always illustrated his own Stage 6 with the statements of historical figures, such as Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, and with the reasoning of professional moral philosophers. Nor is eudaimonism the only mature moral viewpoint that has been denied admittance into Kohlberg’s stage sequence. Hinduism provides a vastly different counterexample (Vasudev & Hummel, 1987) and Tibetan Buddhism another (Huebner & Garrod, 1991). Confucianism provides still another (Cua, 1989; Dien, 1982; Munro, 1969; Waley, 1938). Once Kohlberg’s Kantian presuppositions are held in focus, counterexamples to his position are not hard to find at all.

Turiel on the Moral, the Conventional, and the Prudential

Another clear case of the formalist approach, one that in some ways goes farther than Kohlberg’s, is the recent work of Elliot Turiel and his collaborators.
(Turiel, 1983a; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Shweder, Turiel, & Much, 1981). We find Turiel’s work particularly valuable because of the questions it raises about the definition of the moral domain.

Turiel’s primary concern is how children distinguish the moral domain from other social domains in the course of development. Turiel (1983a; Shweder et al., 1981) takes moral rules to be defined by the criteria laid down by Gewirth (1978). According to Gewirth, moral rules must be categorically obligatory and impersonal, and cannot be rejected “on pain of contradiction.” As these criteria make plain, his moral philosophy is formalist and Kantian. Instead of relying on Rawls’ (1971) social contract mechanism, Gewirth seeks to derive moral rules from nonmoral personal values via an argument about analytically necessary features of human action: Each actor, by performing a simple conceptual analysis of action, must realize that freedom and well-being are analytically necessary for action, and in consequence, that everyone has rights to freedom and well-being (for critiques, see Den Uyl & Rasmussen, 1991; Veatch, 1976, 1979).

On the basis of Gewirth’s criteria, Turiel seeks to distinguish moral rules from conventional social rules (which are arbitrary and changeable means for reaching an agreed-on end). Moral rules are also to be distinguished from standards for one’s own behavior, which are to be regarded as “prudential” or “personal” and nonmoral. Kohlberg thought that moral rules came to be differentiated from prudential rules only at the conventional level of development and that moral rules were not distinguished from social conventions until the postconventional level. By contrast, Turiel regards moral, conventional, and prudential rules as forming distinct domains early in development.

Nucci and Turiel (1978) sought to demonstrate empirically that young children already distinguish between transgressions of moral rules and violations of social conventions. They showed that 3- to 5-year-olds in a nursery school setting responded differently to “moral” transgressions (e.g., hitting another child) than to violations of social conventions (e.g., working in an area not assigned by the teacher). Nucci and Turiel concluded, contrary to Kohlberg’s theory, that moral rules and social conventions are already distinct domains for preschoolers, though it takes until age 10 or so for the domain distinctions to be made with complete consistency or applied to unfamiliar cases (Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987).

An obvious objection to this interpretation is that Kohlberg’s theories focus on how moral rules are explicitly justified. Young children might well differentiate between moral rules and social conventions in practice, without being able to make the differentiation explicitly. But Kohlberg would want them to be able to state, explain, or justify the difference. Shweder et al. (1981) do acknowledge that their moral/conventional distinction is an implicit one, whereas Kohlberg’s is explicit. In short, Kohlberg’s distinction between moral and conventional applies to higher levels of knowing (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986, 1992; Mosherman, 1995), and therefore to higher developmental stages, than Turiel’s does.
A deeper objection is that the domains distinguished by preschoolers in studies like Nucci and Turiel’s may not be moral and conventional domains at all. The “moral” transgressions in the study were all violations of rights or entitlements—physical aggression, taking another’s property, or failing to share a toy that was supposed to be shared. The children’s reactions to these transgressions came especially from the victims—complaints of injury or loss, emotional reactions, enlisting the help of an adult, telling the aggressor to stop, etc. Usually, the children did not respond at all to violations of conventional rules, a role that was left to the adults. Children may be able to recognize simple cases of aggression against persons and property, react negatively to them, and take action against them, without in any way characterizing moral rules as Turiel’s theory claims.

It could even be that young children are reacting to violations of their own autonomy, and feeling empathy for violations of others’ autonomy, without having any other rationale for condemning such violations. In that case, there would not yet be any moral domain for young children; they would not yet be representing or learning about moral issues as such.

Critics have also pointed to other cultures in which many of the issues that Turiel has defined as conventional are treated as moral issues. For instance, children (ages 8 to 10) of the Brahmin caste in the Hindu temple town of Bhubaneswar rate the following as the top four sins: “1. The day after his father’s death, the eldest son had a haircut and ate chicken. 2. One of your family members eats beef regularly. 3. One of your family members eats a dog regularly for dinner. 4. A widow in your community eats fish two or three times a week” (Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987, p. 40). Hardly anyone in Turiel’s American samples would consider any of these to be moral infractions, and none of them fits Turiel’s Gewirthian circumscription of the moral domain.

Defining domains of skill and understanding is a deep problem throughout developmental psychology. Turiel and his collaborators, following the practice of Piaget and many others, regard an a priori classification of fields, or subject matters, as an adequate basis for distinguishing domains in development (Turiel, 1983b; Turiel & Davidson, 1986). But domains cannot be adequately distinguished on the basis of criteria external to the knower (Bickhard & Campbell, submitted; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986); there must be common ways of representing, and common heuristics for learning about, what is in a domain (Campbell & Bickhard, 1992; Campbell, 1993) or common patterns of learning (Keil, 1990). Just because two abilities pertain to the same externally defined subject matter, it does not follow that they are developmentally related. Children may not have common representations or learning heuristics for this subject matter. Just because an investigator can formulate problems that he or she recognizes as moral problems, and can get children to respond to them in a different manner than to problems that the investigator considers to be related to social conventions, it does not follow that children represent them as moral problems. How do
they represent these and similar problems? How do they learn what to do on these and similar problems?

In an area like number development, there is little controversy about which problems belong to the mathematical subject matter, though there is plenty of controversy about children’s understanding of those problems. In an area like moral development, there is controversy about the field—about which problems belong to the moral subject matter. From the formalist Kantian standpoint, moral problems are problems of justice and fairness, problems about violations of rights or entitlements. These are the only kind that need to be investigated. From the eudaimonic standpoint, rights to person and property are but a subset of moral standards and a consequence of deeper moral principles. Private moral standards, such as honesty with oneself, integrity, and the pursuit of one’s specific excellence, are central to the moral field (Norton, 1976; Rand, 1964; Veatch, 1962; Wheeler, 1984), as is practical wisdom, or skill in balancing and choosing among competing goods (Den Uyl, 1991). Such standards and virtues do not belong to what Turiel (1983a) calls the “personal” field, whose central instances are stylistic preferences like one’s taste in clothing or “counsels of prudence” like riding one’s bicycle safely (Tisak & Turiel, 1984). As Blasi (1990, p. 48) points out, for Kantians the personal field is a mere residue, what is left over when rights and social rules have been subtracted and is therefore presumed to be morally irrelevant.

There is no way to tell what issues, if any, children treat as moral by inspecting the daily social interactions of preschoolers for violations of social rules. Many of the issues that eudaimonists consider to be moral would not arise in such a context. Nor would Turiel’s style of investigation enable researchers to determine whether children recognize any connection between violating personal moral standards and violating rights. A different and much broader range of issues would have to be investigated. The proposed boundaries, not only of the moral domain, but also of the moral subject matter, depend on the philosophical conception of morality that the investigator has adopted.

In calling for a broader definition of the moral field, we must now make good on our promise to rebut Rest’s (1983) defense of a distinct domain of “social morality.” In essence, Rest contends that walling off social morality is convenient. Otherwise, moral questions would bleed messily into questions about life, the self, rationality, or society, compelling us to take on the entire “interconnected network of thought” instead of a neatly separable domain. Indeed they would, but we see no way to avoid this inconvenient outcome.

The contrary path, treating morality as self-encapsulated and divorcing it from concerns about life, values, and the self, rapidly leads to absurdity. Turiel makes an effort to cut morality loose from questions about human nature, appealing to a “coordination of moral judgments with the much less than perfect psychological concepts (concepts of persons) that individuals hold” (1983a, p. 218). Since
all defenses of slavery assert that some members of our species are inferior to others, indeed not truly human, and the question of slavery belongs to morality even as narrowly defined by Turiel (see, for instance, Turiel et al., 1987), such an exclusion is impossible. Were the abolitionists and the apologists for slavery before the Civil War merely having trouble coordinating their moral judgments with their concept of a person?

Does the current debate about abortion, for that matter, merely turn on the difficulty of making such a coordination? Turiel, Hildebrandt, and Wainryb (1991) suggest that “informational assumptions” about the beginning of life play a major role in reasoning about abortion and can be separated from the truly moral issues that are involved (why murder is wrong) or the truly personal issues (if an act does not harm others, it should be a matter of personal choice). But assumptions about the beginning of life lie outside the moral domain only because Turiel has so defined them.

To further confuse matters, Turiel and his collaborators have recently invented another category for issues like abortion, homosexuality, and pornography (Helwig, Tisak, & Turiel, 1990; Turiel et al., 1991). These are said to be “non-prototypical,” not clearly moral, but not social conventional or personal either. One of the problems here has been elucidated by Gabennesch (1990a,b): if there are no victims whose rights and entitlements have been violated, then the rule that is being violated cannot be treated as a moral one. Why, then, is it not treated as a conventional rule, one that is arbitrary and changeable by social agreement—or even as a personal matter about which people can make any rules they like? Turiel’s framework makes no provision for such anomalous rules, nonmoral by definition but apparently endowed with moral force. Such rules cannot be moral, yet it is empirically obvious that they are not regarded as either conventional or personal. That is, quite a few Americans believe that there are nonarbitrary rules against homosexuality, pornography, and abortion and regard violations of them as morally wrong.

We want to draw attention to a different but related difficulty. Many of the Americans interviewed by Turiel et al. (1991) consider abortion, or homosexuality, or pornography to be immoral, yet do not believe that such activities should be illegal. From Turiel’s point of view, people consider moral rules to be non-contingent (categorical) and universal and their violation to involve harm to victims. In consequence everyone should judge that whatever is immoral should be illegal. But such a pattern of reasoning (immoral therefore illegal) is not to be expected under all definitions of the moral domain.

There are other moral conceptions, such as eudaimonism, according to which some activities can be contrary to moral standards (for instance, because they involve self-deception or are self-destructive or derail us from achieving our personal excellence), but should not be illegal because they do not violate the rights of other people. Most contemporary liberal eudaimonists would not consider homosexuality to be immoral; quite a few would not consider pornography
to be immoral either; but all would agree that homosexuality and pornography should be legal. More to the point, contemporary liberal eudaimonists would not favor outlawing even patently self-destructive behavior, like massive consumption of mind-altering drugs, so long as it does not violate the rights of others. Drug abuse, in other words, could be regarded as immoral without any implication that it ought to be illegal.

Moreover, it is likely that some of the people interviewed by Turiel and his collaborators are in the grip of competing moral conceptions (for instance, a conception that behavior contrary to “natural” social practices, or contrary to religious injunctions, should be forbidden versus a conception of individual rights). Their internal conflict might even involve the very definition of the moral domain. Turiel’s framework cannot allow internal moral conflicts, unless, of course, they are conflicts between universal, noncontingent principles of rights and legal justice. Otherwise, what appear to be moral conflicts must be resolvable into clashes between moral conceptions and social or institutional or “prudential” or “informational” conceptions, judgments about the “natural order” or even beliefs about “unearthly events” (Turiel et al., 1987).

This last category deserves special attention. When Turiel et al. (1987; Helwig et al., 1990) introduce the category of “unearthly-belief-mediated moral events” to account for many of Shweder et al.’s (1987) findings they have finally stepped out of Gewirthian and Kantian bounds. They explain the moral status of the number 1 sin in Shweder et al.’s (1987) survey, the case of the eldest son getting a haircut and eating chicken the day after his father’s death, on the grounds of harmful consequences in the afterlife: the “deceased father’s soul would not receive salvation if [the] proscription against eating chicken is not observed” (p. 208). Sin number 2, eating beef, is immoral because it brings “harm to the cow, believed to be a sacred being” (p. 209). Turiel et al. declare that “if one accepts the assumption that there is an afterlife and that certain earthly actions affect the well-being of a person in the afterlife, then that action can be regarded as moral [i.e., belonging to the moral domain]” (p. 211). Incidentally, it is not just other souls that will be harmed in the afterlife; from the Hindu perspective, sinning produces negative karma and harms one’s own soul as well.

Kant would not have been impressed with Turiel’s line of reasoning, because it readmits hypothetical imperatives (based on personal consequences for phenomenal selves in the afterlife) into the sphere of moral rules. Kant (1781/1965) believed in an afterlife, which was one of his “ideas of pure reason,” but he made it clear that he could not consider the fate of one’s soul in it to the basis for moral rules—such a basis would make them hypothetical and reduce them all to “counsels of prudence.”

Ironically, Shweder’s (1990) later acceptance of the “unearthly-belief-mediated” category as a partial explanation of his Indian data does no harm to his conception of the moral domain, because his definition is quite a bit broader than Turiel’s. Shweder (1990) packs principles of rights and
Whether the moral domain can be defined as Kantians wish to define it is an empirical question, not to be settled by a priori arguments nor by appeals to the convenience of the investigator. It may just be that moral development is bigger, messier, and more complicated than most investigators have wanted to think. Indeed, in the course of moral development different people may come to define the moral domain differently. In any case, attempts to progressively purify the moral domain of alien considerations about the self, life, rationality, human nature, and the social order are liable to prove wrongheaded. They are liable to lead to a self-perpetuating research program that spins off epicycle after epicycle to protect its own strategies of explanation while forfeiting the chance to say anything interesting about moral development.

Turiel, then, shares the formalist assumptions inherent in Kohlberg’s enterprise: Moral rules are still categorically obligatory; they still pertain to social issues only. But by trying to push distinctions among the moral, the conventional, and the prudential farther back into childhood Turiel has raised domain questions in their starkest form. One cannot defend Turiel’s domain definitions simply by pointing to the empirical success of his narrowly conceived research program. The occasions on which children respond differently to moral transgressions, defined à la Gewirth, than to breaches of social conventions, do not establish that they represent moral rules at all, much less that they represent them (or even treat them in practice) as categorically obligatory. There are other conceptions of the moral field than the one Turiel has chosen to use, and the definitions of the moral domain that people actually arrive at during the course of development, though currently unexplored, are probably more varied than the rival conceptions of the moral field that we have been considering.

**Gilligan’s Ethic of Care**

In rejecting the confusion between moral rules and social conventions supposedly prevalent in Kohlberg’s lower stages, Turiel only strengthens the grip of post-Kantian formalism. Other attempts at revision have struck at formalism justice, “unearthly-belief-mediated” moral principles, and even a good deal of what Helwig et al. (1990) continue to maintain are pure social conventions into his more expansive conception. Shweder’s rationale for this definition is a conception of “natural moral law” that is evidently non-Kantian, although unfortunately not well explicated. It is worth noting, too, that Turiel et al. (1987, p. 198) do not do much better with another dimension of religious morality that is brought to the forefront in Shweder’s work, ritual cleanliness. They try to turn orthodox Hindu taboos against menstruating women into a mere “prudential” belief based on the empirical premise that menstrual blood is poisonous. It would make as much sense to reduce the ritual separation of milk and meat in orthodox Jewish dietary laws to an empirical belief about what is good for the digestion! Or consider the Confucian virtue of li. Li is simultaneously an intellectual virtue, a basic moral virtue, and a way of maintaining harmony with the natural order—and it requires punctilious performance of rituals (Cua, 1989; Dien, 1982). Turiel’s style of analysis would be compelled to chop it into at least three different pieces.
itself. The most celebrated of these is Carol Gilligan’s (1982) conception of an ethic of care as distinct from the formalist conception of legal justice reasoning.

The superheated rhetoric and claims of unprecedented discovery that frequently accompany presentations of Gilligan’s position (e.g., Lyons, 1983; Brown & Tappan, 1991) do not conceal the fact that Gilligan began as a student of Kohlberg’s and that she still subscribes without question to a number of distinctively Kohlbergian assertions. Her overall conception of development is little changed—though she does not currently cast her own work in stage terms, she continues to endorse Kohlberg’s parochially structuralist interpretation of developmental stages.\(^3\) She affirms her faith that all postconventional reasoners will agree that Heinz should steal the drug. Gilligan’s biggest concession of all is to acknowledge the validity of Kohlberg’s account of justice reasoning—so long as care gets equal billing.

On the other hand, Gilligan and her students have become increasingly critical of Kantian formalism and impersonalism. In some of her earlier work Gilligan concerned herself with the advent of contextual considerations in the moral reasoning of young adults, a development that could be interpreted only as relativistic (hence as a regression) within the Kohlbergian framework (Murphy & Gilligan, 1980). She was already chafing at the rigidities of Kohlberg’s conception of mature moral reasoning. She went on to define a full-fledged ethic of care and responsibility, which she opposed to the primacy of justice in Kohlberg’s framework (Gilligan, 1982).

We are not interested here in Gilligan’s claims about sex differences, which Brabecck (1983) diagnosed as “mythic” and which have had to be weakened over the years. What concerns us is the commonly reiterated assertion, incorporated right into the scoring procedures, that there are only two possible moral orientations, justice and care, and thus that Kohlberg and Gilligan between them have fully mapped the moral domain (Lyons, 1983; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988; Brown & Tappan, 1991). Like Flanagan (1991), we do not believe that figure/ground metaphors and allusions to the universality of inequality and attachment are adequate to establish the existence of two and only two moral orientations. Kohlberg has not provided an analysis of eudaimonism, or Confucianism, or Tibetan Buddhism, or orthodox Hinduism, that subsumes their principles and concerns under the justice orientation; Gilligan has not subsumed them under the care orientation.

Of comparable significance to us is whether Gilligan’s findings and her ethic of care are consistent with the Kantian legacy. In the Kohlbergian camp the response has been ambivalent. Kohlberg et al. (1983) tried to accommodate as

\(^3\) Kohlberg’s interpretations of Piaget and his overall outlook on development cannot be examined here (for a critique of middle-period Piagetian structuralism of the sort embraced by Kohlberg, see Campbell and Bickhard, 1986). Nor do we have space to scrutinize his specific applications to issues of justice of Piagetian conceptions like equilibration and reversibility (see Potts, 1992).
much of Gilligan’s conception of moral issues as they could. They went so far as
to assert that an altruistic “ethic of care” is subsumed by their justice stages—
indeed, that justice and care are wholly integrated at Stage 6. Such assertions are
untenable. Special concern for those one loves (which is critical to the care
orientation) might squeak by in Stages 3 and 4, though only when mediated by
expectations about social roles. This is not true at Stage 5. Stage 6 thinkers owe
duties impartially to every needy person in the world, so particular relationships
have to be morally irrelevant to them. They will have to find some impersonal
principle or commandment of the noumenal will to guide them in their relations
with friends and loved ones. The difficulty of saving a niche for love and
friendship in a Kantian conception of morality has been widely noted since the

At other times, Kohlberg et al. (1983) forthrightly reject those aspects of
Gilligan’s material that resist impersonal treatment as merely “personal” and
nonmoral. They downgrade a morality of care as secondary to justice and deci-
sions made in it as affective and not “rational” (by which they mean not formal
or a priori—given their acknowledged inscrutability, the rationality of belief in
the noumenal self and its categorical imperatives is open to question). Nunner-
Winkler (1984), in a more graceful attempt at reconciliation, claims that Kohl-
berg and Gilligan really disagree only on definitions of the good life, which in a
Kantian perspective has the convenient property of not belonging to the moral
domain.

There is less ambivalence in the Gilligan camp, which has come to reject
post-Kantian formalism quite forthrightly for its inability to come to terms with
care (e.g., Lyons, 1983) and its requirement that the self be “separate” and
“objective” rather than “connected.” Gilligan’s conception is often interpreted as
altruistic, because it makes care and responsibility for other people paramount.
Programmatic statements can be found to support this claim: “In a perspective of
response, the focus is always on the needs of others: it is the welfare or well-
being of others that is important . . .” (Lyons, 1983). We think it would be
misleading, however, to include Gilligan in the altruist or “prosocial” camp, for
reasons that will become clearer when we consider that position. Gilligan’s work
introduces personal values into moral reasoning in a way that undermines both
Kantian conceptions.

Specifically, Gilligan introduces concerns about the self that any sort of Kant-
ian must disdain as morally irrelevant or subversive of duty. In Gilligan’s (1982)
abortion interviews, women struggle with the notion that concern with their own
needs is purely “selfish” and morally illegitimate. Gilligan considers it a sign of
growth when they reject the subordination of their needs to those of others.
Although for her the endpoint of development involves balanced concern for self
and others and some of the women voice altruistic ideals in their resolution of the
abortion dilemmas, this aspect of Gilligan’s work is nonetheless revolutionary.
Neither the formalist nor altruist framework will ever treat attention to one’s own
needs as a moral issue; the very idea of “care for self” (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan & Attanucci, 1988) must remain anomalous from either standpoint.

The most important contribution that Gilligan and her students could bring to the study of moral development thus lies buried and implicit. They have challenged Kohlberg’s brand of post-Kantian formalism and impersonalism (while continuing, we suspect, to accord exaggerated prominence to it). They have tied the development of morality to the development of the self in a manner that formalists cannot tolerate. They have discarded Kohlberg’s stage sequence. They have adopted mildly subversive research methods, like asking people, “What does morality mean to you?” What they have not done is openly challenge the assumption that morality must be other-regarding. Continued affirmations crop up rather often, for instance, in Johnston’s assertion (1988, p. 65) that morality pertains to resolving conflicts in our relationships with others.

Gilligan is, in our view, completely right to treat issues of self-concept and personal growth as morally relevant, but she has not realized that reintegrating moral development with personality development and the development of the self requires us to reject the Kantian legacy in toto. Gilligan might have arrived at this conclusion herself had she come to grips with other systems of mature moral reasoning. In surveying the moral domain, Gilligan and her collaborators have progressed from tunnel vision to myopia; there is a great deal more to the landscape than impersonal justice and self-sacrificing care.

The attempts to revise or extend Kohlberg’s theory, then, are of considerable interest. Turiel has jettisoned Kohlberg’s moral stage sequence but clamped a narrow formalist definition ever more tightly around the moral domain. Gilligan has challenged the sufficiency of the post-Kantian formalist approach for accounting for the moral thought of adults in everyday life. So far these doubts have led to piecemeal extensions of the moral domain, the ad hoc addition of another moral orientation, or calls for a synthesis of the two and only two orientations (Puka, 1991; Brown & Tappan, 1991). They have not led anyone to rethink the conception of morality that was used to define the moral domain.

By contrast, the advocates of altruistic or prosocial conceptions of moral development have been outspoken in questioning Kohlberg’s definition of the moral domain. They have thrown out or deemphasized formal rules, but without questioning the root post-Kantian conception of morality as other-regarding; in fact, they have introduced new difficulties into the study of moral development.

ALTRUISM

Altruism does not define moral rules in formal terms. Rather than being interested in how the structure of moral thought becomes more sophisticated over time, the advocates of this approach are interested in the content of an altruistic (other-centered) morality and how it can be inculcated in children. They take it for granted that the essence of morality is self-sacrifice and duty, especially dutiful acts done for the benefit of others. Martin Hoffman (1970), a leading
member of the altruistic school, has declared that every moral person feels a
certain amount of permanent guilt for not devoting his or her entire life to the
service of others. This pervasive guilt is “normal” and “non-neurotic.” Lack of
such guilt indicates deficient moral development.

The major focus of the altruistic school is the development of altruistic or, as
is it is frequently called, “prosocial” behavior. Much effort has been devoted to
finding out how such behavior develops and how it can be encouraged. Such
research invariably presupposes that (1) moral behavior is altruistic behavior; (2)
social existence constantly requires, and benefits from, altruistic behavior (hence
the term “prosocial”); and (3) psychologists should work to foster prosocial
behavior. Let us consider each of these presuppositions in turn.

Is Advanced Moral Reasoning Altruistic?

Some of the difficulties raised by the altruistic conception are apparent in an
early study by one of its foremost exponents, Nancy Eisenberg (Eisenberg-Berg,
1979). This study investigated the development of prosocial moral reasoning by
means of dilemmas similar to Kohlberg’s. However, Eisenberg’s problems were
“prosocial” dilemmas. They posed a clear choice between acting altruistically
and refusing to do so.

Eisenberg has faulted Kohlberg for restricting the domain of moral reasoning
to issues of moral and political justice (in this respect, her critique is convergent
with our own). She claims that moral reasoning about prosocial acts must also be
included and that children and adolescents may display more advanced reasoning
about prosocial issues than about laws and institutions. More important, she
believes that more advanced reasoning will lead to more prosocial choices—
which may well suit the unstated bias in Kohlberg’s stage scheme, despite his
professed neutrality about the content of moral judgments. When overriding
duties prescribed by formal social morality do not apply, Eisenberg maintains,
the needs of others always get moral priority:

It may be difficult to justify putting one’s own needs before those of another in a
prosocial conflict for any but hedonistic reasons because there are no formal rules, prohi-
bitions, or obligations in prosocial dilemmas that the individual can use to justify ignoring
the other’s needs. (Eisenberg-Berg, 1979, p. 129)

In Eisenberg’s early study, 125 children from 2nd to 12th grade were given
four moral judgment story problems, each of which featured a conflict between
the actor’s wants and those of a needy other. In one story, Bob, a swimmer, has
to decide between donating his services as a physical therapy instructor for
crippled children and devoting enough time to practice for important swimming
competitions. In another, a college student is asked to donate blood over several
weeks, at the cost of physical weakness, loss of job, and disruption of studies. In
all of the stories, the altruistic act will have heavy costs for the actor, and the pain
and sacrifice are stressed. Nonetheless, the participants in the study were expected to regard the altruistic act as morally obligatory.

All the same, there were plenty of nonaltruistic responses—58% of the participants gave at least one. Eisenberg classified fully 95% of the nonaltruistic responses as “hedonistic” or “pragmatic.” By contrast, the reasons given for the “prosocial” choices followed a developmental trend through stages like Kohlberg’s (Stages 1 through 5, as defined in terms of ideal types, were represented).

Eisenberg has extended this line of research over many studies, examining the growth and decline of various types of reasoning on prosocial dilemmas as development proceeds. The same categories of moral reasoning have been retained throughout this work, including pragmatic and hedonistic. However, the later studies (e.g., Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1991) no longer report how many nonaltruistic choices were made on the dilemmas! We can only presume that such choices are still regarded as being based on hedonistic or pragmatic reasoning.

Why are the negative responses invariably fixated at Stage 2? Eisenberg equates morality with altruistic choices, so a nonaltruistic response, in the face of an obvious commandment to duty, can only be attributed to “selfishness” or expediency. Moreover, the only stage in Kohlberg’s model which includes explicit appeals to one’s own goals is Stage 2, the pragmatic–hedonistic orientation. This is a preconventional stage, characteristic of middle childhood. It reflects a primitive conception of one’s relationship to others and no consideration at all of the basis for rules governing social behavior. The conventional stages, which mark the beginnings of such consideration, are defined so as to exclude references to one’s own goals from moral reasoning: Stage 3 is based on wanting to conform and be socially acceptable, and Stage 4 is concerned with maintaining the existing social order. These stages would be biased toward altruistic choices to the story problems in any case, since altruism is part of the received morality in our culture. And a moral defense of one’s own goals is ruled out in the postconventional stages, because it would be incompatible with the overtly Kantian conception of moral rules expressed at Stages 5 and 6.

No doubt many of the refusals to endorse an altruistic act came unaccompanied by sophisticated arguments. The received morality has no place for principles that defend one’s moral ownership over one’s own life, and confusion or rationalization or defiance toward social expectations are predictable consequences. But suppose that a respondent to Eisenberg’s dilemmas gave a well-organized speech, stating that her own happiness was her highest goal, that human flourishing was her moral standard, that independence and productivity were of the foremost importance to her, that someone else’s need did not impose a moral obligation on her to satisfy it, and that self-sacrifice is destructive to human life and happiness, all backed by quotations from Aristotle, Rand, and a dozen other eminent thinkers? This would be to no avail. Her reasoning would
still be categorized as Stage 2. Yet at Stage 2, no articulated moral or social philosophy is supposed to be present. In fact, Eisenberg’s stage scheme would not differentiate between such a sophisticated response and the flat statement that Bob should not help the crippled children because he does not feel like it.4

In sum, Eisenberg’s scoring system presumes that a principled refusal to perform an altruistic act cannot exist. The insistence on making self-sacrifice morally obligatory is a Kantian bias. It denies moral recognition to a conception like eudaimonism, which recognizes the obligation not to violate another person’s rights but does not embrace generalized, unchosen moral obligations to do things for others. Having decided a priori that refusals to act altruistically are morally immature, Eisenberg has prevented herself from ever noticing any counterexamples to her thesis.

Is “Prosocial” Behavior Altruistically Motivated?

Despite these criticisms, we believe that Eisenberg’s work deserves commendation for its clear statement that altruistic acts involve genuine self-sacrifice. By self-sacrifice, we mean (and we assume Eisenberg means) giving up a value that the actor regards as more important for one that is less important (an actor who gives up a greater value for a lesser from an observer’s perspective has simply made a mistake, be it trivial or tragic). Most prosocial research does not venture beyond the acquisition and performance of prosocial behavior and does not maintain a clear distinction between acts whose effect is to benefit others and acts that are altruistically motivated (see, for instance, the reviews by Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977; Radke-Yarrow, Zahn-Waxler, & Chapman, 1983; and Sharabany & Bar-Tal, 1982; see also the probing critique of theories of “altruistic” motivation by Batson, 1987).

Just as there is a wide range of possible motives for “prosocial acts,” there is considerable diversity in conceptions of prosocial behavior:

A definition of prosocial behavior that is least committing theoretically is action that benefits another person. Children, by this definition, are prosocial. They are helpful to others. They can show consideration for others’ feelings and indignation over cruelty. They engage in cooperative ventures and share possessions. They may risk their own welfare to protect or rescue another. The unity that joins these different behaviors is their positive consequences for the recipients. . . . in the same external forms of the child’s generosity, there are possibilities of an ingenuous joy of giving, a self-serving manipulation of another person, a calculated but painful decision to share, or a principled response out of a sense of duty. Which of these qualify as prosocial behavior? Some investigators assume an underlying egoism of prosocial behavior, whereas others believe egoism and prosocial

4 For that matter, the advocacy of genuine hedonism or pragmatism as a moral philosophy requires cognitive powers well beyond those of Stage 2. Would anyone classify Epicurus or William James as an unreflective Stage 2 thinker?
behavior to be inherently contradictory. Still others are unconcerned about motives. (Radke-Yarrow et al., 1983, p. 478)

An act that appears to be altruistic (for instance, helping someone in need) could thus be motivated by: (1) sincere belief that altruistic acts are required by impersonal principles of duty; (2) special “selfish” value placed on the other person (love, friendship, admiration); (3) a general sense of benevolence toward other human beings, even strangers; (4) a desire to impress others by behaving according to the received morality, which praises altruistic acts; (5) desire to gain power by making the recipient indebted or beholden to the giver. And this is by no means a complete list. Which of these motives predominates has profound implications for the actor’s hierarchy of values, moral attitudes, personality, and sense of self-worth, not to mention what virtues (if any) the actor should be credited with, and what other “prosocial” conduct the actor is likely to engage in.

It is worth noting that some moral development researchers consider “prosocial” behavior a worthy topic of study even though they are psychological egoists and therefore do not believe in the possibility of actions in the first category, those that are altruistically motivated. Liebert (1979), for instance, maintains that “moral reasoning and conduct . . . arise out of the innate self-interest of the individual organism, whose verbal and nonverbal interpersonal dealings with others are shaped by the law of effect that governs the activities of all living beings. The emphasis of this perspective is on experienced, perceived, or anticipated rewards and punishments” (p. 253).

From Liebert’s standpoint, an apparently altruistic act could have just about any motive except a truly altruistic one. It is not clear to us why “prosocial” actions would continue to be a coherent topic of study if this were so. Given Liebert’s endorsement of moral relativism and his dim and thoroughly Hobbesian view of human nature, it would seem that “prosocial” in his vocabulary merely signifies whatever kind of social behavior gets rewarded in a particular society. Was hiding Jews from the Nazis prosocial behavior? According to Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg (1977) it was; from the Nazi standpoint it assuredly was not. Whose definition of prosocial behavior follows from Liebert’s stated position? We suspect that Liebert, despite his avowed denial that any moral commitment underlies his efforts to substitute “prosocial” for violent behavior in television programming (1979, p. 242), is in fact committed to altruism (he does explicitly define morality as social).

Whether Liebert’s position is tenable or not, eudaimonists are not Hobbesians and do not accept “social learning” as a general explanation of moral development. We agree with Eisenberg and other advocates of Kantian altruism that altruistic behavior is possible—human beings can act against what they regard as their self-interest; they can give up a greater value for a lesser value. We disagree with their proposition that human beings ought to act altruistically.
There is no doubt, in any case, about the motive that a Kantian altruist must have—the Kantian altruist must act out of duty. Acting out of self-interested concern for another is clearly not acting out of duty. Acting to gain the approval of others is not acting out of duty. Duty comes into play when there is no strong personal value involved or when personal values would be harmed by the act.

To be kind where one can is a duty, and there are, moreover, many persons so sympathetically constituted that without any motive of vanity or selfishness they find an inner satisfaction in spreading joy, and rejoice in the contentment of others which they have made possible... however dutiful and amiable it may be, that kind of action has no true moral worth... But assume that the mind of that friend of mankind was clouded by a sorrow of his own which extinguished all sympathy with the lot of others and that he still had the power to benefit others in distress, but that their need left him untouched because he was preoccupied with his own need. And now suppose him to tear himself, unsolicited by inclination, out of this dead insensitivity and to perform this action only from duty and without any inclination—then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth, (Kant, 1785/1959, p. 398)

Prosocial behavior researchers frequently ignore the distinctions that we have just drawn. Some even fall back on a behaviorist or “social learning” position: So long as parents and teachers can arrange incentives that encourage the developing child to perform acts that benefit others, the motives do not matter. Yet the developmental course and consequences of “prosocial acts” directed toward friends and loved ones, or motivated by generalized benevolence, or done out of duty, or impelled by a desire to feel superior to the recipient are likely to be different in each case.

In fact, if we think of “prosocial acts” in terms of their underlying motives, rather than their superficial similarities (their presumed benefit to others) they do not form a coherent psychological category. Certainly not a coherent category within moral development. A theory of moral acts is a theory of acts that are motivated by moral conceptions and not of acts that others happen to think are moral (Locke, 1983). A reasonable theory of moral development will not attempt a unitary explanation of the nature or origins of “prosocial acts.” They are learned in so many different ways and done for so many different reasons that there is no reason to expect such an explanation.

*Is Altruistic Behavior Prosocial?*

Altruistic acts are said to be prosocial—beneficial for human societies and even necessary for them to function successfully. Altruistic acts are frequently *equated* with prosocial acts, acts with beneficial consequences for others. Yet it is remarkably easy to identify acts that benefit others but are not altruistic and acts that are altruistically motivated but actually harm others.

Equating altruistic behavior with prosocial behavior betrays a lack of understanding of the actual operations of social relationships, exchanges, and institutions. As sociologists and economists are well aware, one cannot derive the
consequences of a policy or institution from the intent of the actors involved or vice versa (Hayek, 1976; Schelling, 1978; Sowell, 1980, 1987).

On the one hand, results that are beneficial to everyone often flow from purely self-interested behavior. Free market economists have stressed the success of a market economy in coordinating the plans of many individuals, each of whom possesses limited and specialized knowledge (and very particularistic goals), without conscious direction or design (Smith, 1776/1981; Hayek, 1948). Most exchanges in a market economy are carried on by individuals seeking profit. Profit and loss, as consequences of a free price system, indicate whether an individual or organization is satisfying consumer demand or not. In fact, they are necessary if the economic system is to coordinate people’s plans at all. In a system without free market prices, profit, and loss, rational economic calculation is impossible. No decisions can be made about what to produce, and how much, that would satisfy consumer demand (Mises, 1922/1936; 1949/1966). The impossibility of rational calculation under socialism is no mere exercise in hypothetical analysis, as the recent collapse of the Soviet and Eastern European economic systems has made painfully clear.

Those who equate altruistic with prosocial behavior, however, conclude that the results of profit-seeking activities, which on the face of it are not done for altruistic motives, must be invariably injurious to others. Mussen and Eisenberg-Berg (1977) see no good in competition and self-assertion, which are purely antisocial (that is, nonaltruistic) and must therefore produce nothing but dissen- sion and violence.

On the other hand, many activities ostensibly motivated by altruism are by no means “prosocial” in their effects. They are actually harmful to others. There are many such cases at the level of “public policy”; for instance, minimum wage laws supposedly ensure wages above the minimum for everyone. Elementary economic analysis indicates that minimum wages cannot bring about such a result; instead they put out of work anyone whose labor would receive an offer of less than the minimum wage. And if there is some moral case to override the economic one (for instance, an argument that being unemployed or on the dole is better for human beings than working for less than the minimum wage), it is incumbent on the proponents of this policy to step forward with it.

Indeed, when altruistically motivated actions are based on an assumption about what is good for the recipient—an assumption that the recipient may not share—then the danger of paternalism looms: The giver presumes that the recipient must not know what is good for him or her and must even be incapable of making responsible decisions. Altruism, at the very least, is able to coexist with a considerable degree of disrespect for others (and critics would say that it actively breeds disrespect).

At a more personal level, consider the toll on those who make major life decisions on the basis of wanting to please their parents. Those who choose their careers or their marriages on this basis are likely to be unhappy for the rest of
their lives, and one wonders whether their future customers and clients, let alone their spouses, are best served by people who have made such choices altruistically. Not to mention the way anyone would feel on being told, “I do not love you because of any sterling or attractive qualities that you might have, because of anything about you that might appeal or be attractive to me. No, I love you just as I love everyone else, out of duty.” Not every activity that is “well-intentioned” succeeds in accomplishing anything like the desired result. Equating altruistic behavior with prosocial behavior leads irresistibly to the false conclusion that any altruistically motivated activity will actually be good for others. If anything, the reverse is more likely.

Is Inculcating Altruistic Behavior Beneficial?

In general, prosocial behavior researchers have not recognized any damaging consequences, not to mention ill-intentioned uses, of supposedly “prosocial” ideas and programs. We should be reminded that according to Kant (1785/1958, pp. 392-393), “Nothing in the world . . . can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will,” i.e., a will moved only by duty. For Kant, the consequences of acts motivated by duty were morally irrelevant. In fact, he acknowledged that following the commandments of duty would thwart one’s inclinations and was therefore likely to make one miserable. As for the beneficiaries of one’s acts, Kant (1797/1991) did counsel making the happiness of others one’s goal, but hastened to add that merely gratifying their inclinations is not what he had in mind—so we might be pardoned for wondering if the consequences for others might turn out any better.\(^5\) We can illustrate the decidedly mixed consequences of altruistically motivated behavior by examining two societies that Mussen and Eisenberg hold up as exemplars.

Mussen and Eisenberg (1977, p. 3) praise the Hopi for their moral ideals of helpfulness, avoidance of aggression, and concern for the general welfare, with which Hopi children are socialized. “Competition, dissension, and self-assertion are strikingly absent in the traditional Hopi community,” they note approvingly. There are costs to discouraging competition, however, though one would not know this from Mussen and Eisenberg’s account. Schoeck (1970) has pointed out that in cultures which do not use conceptions of ability or luck to explain an individual’s success or failure, illness, and misfortune are attributed to witchcraft instead. If Farmer A has an abundant corn crop, and Farmer B’s corn withers and is attacked by locusts, it is not because Farmer A got more rain, or happened to be out of the path of the locust swarm, or worked harder. It must be because Farmer A used black magic to improve his crop at the expense of Farmer B’s. Farmer B feels justified in casting his own spells (or using more tangible and

\(^5\) To his credit, Kant (1797/1991, p. 454) did wonder whether a nobleman who paternalistically looks after the welfare of his serfs deserves moral credit for his actions when he thereby robs them of their freedom.
reliably injurious means) to get back at Farmer A. Private strain and discord lurk beneath the public harmony in Hopi society, for the Hopi believe that illness and misfortune are caused by witchcraft, and everyone fears being magically harmed by others. Boasting about one’s good fortune is to be avoided because it will stir up envy and induce others to start “sorcerous operations” (Schoeck, 1970, p. 34).

Let us consider another society whose educational practices earned Mussen and Eisenberg’s unreserved praise. Unlike the Hopi, this was not a peaceful society. In the USSR at the time they wrote, altruism and orientation toward the collective were inculcated by the school system and by organizations for children and youth like the Young Pioneers. For this program of “character development” they had nothing but approbation (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977, pp. 57-59).

A quick history of the Soviet educational system might have made its meaning and consequences more clear. Anton Makarenko, a leading educator under the Stalin regime, originated the emphasis on training children to obey the collective. He aimed to mold children into servants of the State. He reorganized the school system along military lines, suppressing 1920s experiments in self-organization and self-discipline in education on the grounds that children exposed to them were unlikely to adopt the attitudes desired by the Stalin dictatorship (Spring, 1980, pp. 35-37). One of the virtues still being taught in the Soviet educational system in the 1970s was willingness to denounce to the authorities any members of one’s group who ventured the wrong opinions (see Bronfenbrenner, 1970, the same source from which Mussen and Eisenberg drew their glowing account).

Who will mourn the passing of this approach to education?

Prosocial behavior researchers would be far more credible were they to emphasize voluntary cooperation and voluntary assistance to others. Praise for the Soviet educational system confirms the worst fears of the critics of altruism, who have long argued that a major function of altruistic ideals, and of altruistic moral training, is to make people submit to religious authorities and to tyrannical governments (Rand, 1964). Altruism commands everyone to sacrifice for everyone else. Were it to be pursued strictly, there would be no net benefit from the round of sacrifices. The implementation of altruism therefore requires the identification of a morally privileged class, a group of people who are deemed especially worthy of receiving sacrifices from others. Usually these morally privileged classes are the needy, their representatives (real or alleged), and, most important of all, the rulers. Altruistic moral systems are always invoked by those who seek coercive authority over others; for instance, the Church in Medieval Europe or the Italian Fascists. A leading slogan of the Nazis was “Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz” — the common good goes before the individual good (Peikoff, 1982).

Let us be clear here. We are not saying that prosocial behavior researchers aim to make everyone submit to an omnipotent government. No doubt most of them would be horrified at such a prospect. No doubt they would be prepared to argue that authoritarians and totalitarians are not acting in the true spirit of altruism, but
are instead trying to steal its moral prestige to rationalize their actions. What we
would like to hear is some open discussion of these matters. Are prosocial
behavior researchers really advocating altruism? Does altruism require a morally
privileged class to whom sacrifices are owed? If so, how can this moral privilege
be justified? Is altruism voluntary or does it mean compelling unwilling indi-
viduals to make sacrifices? If so, on what grounds can such compulsion be
justified?

In the contemporary developmental literature, such questions are passed over
in silence, because whatever is altruistically motivated is presumed to be moral.

Prosocial Development: Is There Such a Thing?

We can now summarize the issues that the altruists have not addressed. (1) They
have uncritically accepted Kantian duty and self-sacrifice as the basis for
ethics. (2) They have equated prosocial acts (those that are beneficial to the
functioning of society) with altruistically motivated acts. In fact, there are acts
that are prosocial in effect, but lack altruistic motives, and acts that have altruistic
motives, but are not prosocial in effect. (3) They have overlooked social and
economic processes in which the “selfish” and “greedy” behavior of individual
actors ends up having beneficial consequences for others. (4) They have passed
over harmful uses of altruistic training, including its political employment to
ensure submission to the State.

Failure to respond to any of these problems would be fatal for the altruistic
approach. Even a weaker version—one that merely claims that altruistic acts will
tend to be of more benefit to others than nonaltruistic acts—would have alot of
explaining to do. But problem (2) is the most devastating, because if moral acts
have to be motivated by moral conceptions, and a myriad of motives can underlie
any particular “prosocial” act, then there can be no such thing as prosocial moral
development. The term “prosocial” as currently used is explanatorily empty in
accounting for moral actions or for moral development.

Naturally, as parents and as teachers, we have an interest in preventing chil-
dren from bullying other children. Most of us regard it as beneficial to teach
children not to ridicule other children who are different from themselves. We can
all agree that in many cases it is valuable to encourage children to be kind and
helpful to others. Some of us may even strive for a moral atmosphere in which
people will carry out heroic acts of resistance to tyranny, like hiding Jews from
the Nazis. But there is no need for any of these sorts of actions to be altruistically
motivated and nothing to be gained by regimenting diverse kinds of action,
variously motivated, with different developmental origins and courses, under the
misleading banner of “prosocial behavior.”

Formalist and altruist accounts of moral development unduly narrow the moral
domain, exclude genuine instances of principled moral reasoning from consid-
eration or downgrade them unfairly, and rule questions about the self and about
moral personality out of consideration. In addition, the altruist approach makes
clearly incorrect assumptions about the nature and consequences of altruistically motivated behavior. Could the Kantian approach be developed in other directions besides the two that have been taken historically? Maybe so, but it does not leave much room. Impersonalism and antipersonalism are inherent in Kant’s position, as is the narrowing of the moral domain. Formalism is deeply rooted in it. And without the diremption between morality and personal values, nothing distinctly Kantian would remain.

It is time to consider the advantages that a eudaimonistic perspective might bring to the study of moral development. We will begin by contrasting eudaimonist and Kantian answers to the question “Why be moral?” and will conclude by considering what the study of moral development might look like once moral character becomes a central concern and the moral domain is accorded something like its true breadth and diversity.

BEYOND KANT: NEW DIRECTIONS IN MORAL DEVELOPMENT

Why Be Moral?

Eudaimonism and Kantianism are fundamentally opposed on the moral significance of private goals and values and on the purpose of morality in human life. Indeed, eudaimonism is prepared to answer questions about the purpose of morality, whereas Kantianism is not. Why be moral? Why do human beings need a morality? Does all this fuss about morality have any meaning at all? Eudaimonism does not take the existence of moral rules for granted. It traces the need for morality to the requirements of human life and human flourishing. Whether it has done so successfully or not can be questioned, but the question is subject to rational debate. Kantianism, on the other hand, is barred in principle from offering an answer to that question. “The ground of [moral laws] must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in which he is placed. . . .” (Kant, 1785/1959, p. 389). Following moral rules cannot be said to be good for anyone, in any sense. To explain how following moral rules aids one in achieving any goal, or instantiates any goal, is to make them hypothetical instead of categorical and to make them dependent on inclinations, in other words, to disqualify them from being moral.

Kohlberg acknowledged this very difficulty. In the end, he admitted that Stage 6 could not be a fully adequate endpoint for moral development, because a self-contained formalism for justice reasoning cannot answer the question, “Why be moral?” Beyond the elusive Stage 6, Kohlberg and Power (1981) came to posit a “soft” Stage 7, a stage of “rational mysticism.” This stage involves religious speculations about the nature of the world and the meaning of human life, mystical experience, transcendental illumination, and adoption of the role of prophet, saint, or guru. Despite the constant drumbeat of assertions that morality is purely “rational” or “cognitive,” in the end Kantian approaches must rely on “transcendental illumination” or on mystical insights into the quirks and cravings
of the noumenal self. The basis for morality lies forever beyond rational comprehension.

Of course, the noumenal will, an unknowable agency unrelated to any real human desires, values, or goals, is not to be found in any contemporary account of mind, we think for good reason (though for a dissenting view, see Robinson, 1991). Without the noumenal self, modern-day Kantians have to account somehow for the origins or grounds of all of the commands to duty of which moral actors and reasoners are supposedly aware. The altruists have no other basis besides “intuition” and popular sentiment for the self-sacrificing duties on which they insist. The formalists have their procedures for deriving moral conclusions about social behavior by pressing nonmoral personal interests through a filter of universalizability (Rawls, 1971; Gewirth, 1978; Habermas, 1979). Such attempts are doomed from the outset (Rasmussen & Den Uyl, 1991; Veatch, 1976, 1979, 1980). The gulf that the Kantians have opened up between interests and morality is too wide. If personal interests are not the sort of thing that could ever be moral, how is it possible to extract moral rules from them? (Veatch, 1980).

Kantians might respond that psychology simply does not inquire into the metaphysical basis of morality. We are willing to grant this objection up to a point. Although psychology can investigate the consequences for the actor of harboring one set of moral values or another, explaining why people should be moral and justifying one moral view vis-à-vis other moral views belong in the province of philosophy. It is not our task as psychologists to mount a full exposition and defense of eudaimonist ethics. For that, it is best to turn to the long roll of philosophers beginning with Aristotle (325 BC/1941) and continuing in our own era with Den Uyl (1991), Kaufman (1973), Norton (1976), Rand (1964), Rasmussen (1982, 1992; Den Uyl & Rasmussen, 1978, 1996; Rasmussen & Den Uyl, 1991), and Veatch (1962, 1971). Besides, any conception of moral development worth adopting will have to explain how people can come to believe in and live by moral codes radically different from anything eudaimonistic. But even the most empirically bound description of moral development has to honor the fact that some people ask “Why be moral?” and answer this question in ways that neither the formalists nor the altruists could ever acknowledge.

The Kantian diremptions and constrictions do much more than frustrate our philosophical inquiries. Because the pursuit of private goals is considered prudential and nonmoral, key questions of personal choice and personal growth are thrust outside the realm of morality altogether.

What about Bob, for instance? What guidance do formalism and altruism give him while caught in the toils of Eisenberg’s dilemma? Neither has anything to say to Bob about the wisdom of trying to become a champion swimmer, whether the amount of time and pain he will have to devote to his quest is worthwhile, or whether some other direction in his life might not be better for him. Bob’s efforts in these areas of his life are reduced to hedonistic or pragmatic gratification of appetites, mere giving in to inclinations, and there is nothing challenging, diffi-
cult, or important about them. What is truly moral, what is challenging and
difficult, is not what Bob does in pursuit of a career; only giving up that career
to give swimming lessons to crippled children would be moral. Because the
pursuit of private goals is regarded as purely appetitive, formalism and altruism
offer no advice about what is good for the individual, just periodic admonitions
to give it up, generally on the behalf of some other individual, whose good is
meaningfully of appetitive rationality or rational appetites, [post-Kantian] phi-
osophy dichotomized reason and appetite to such an extent that they became
irreconcilable... The result of this approach has been modern man’s vacillation
between sentimentality and/or hedonism on the one hand and deontological
rigidity in ethics on the other” (Rasmussen & Den Uyl, 1991, pp. 27–28).

In fact, critics of Kantian ethics contend that the very notion of moral rules as
commands to duty undercuts moral responsibility. Duties are divorced from
personal values and often in conflict with them. This conflict may end up de-
stroying our motivation to be moral, or lead us to deny or repress personal values,
or both. Rand (1970) considers the concept of duty to be anti-teleological, un-
dermining one’s sense of the efficient and the final causality of one’s actions.
Actions done out of duty are not done to achieve any goal nor with any regard
to their consequences. How can one feel any responsibility for actions one did not
cause? Rasmussen and Den Uyl point out that the attempt to reduce everything
in ethics to universal formal rules undercuts responsibility in a different way as
well: “Since contingency is a feature of practical action, the effort to remove it
necessitates conformity of will and action... What is allowed to qualify as
‘good’ is admitted only if it applies in precisely the same manner to everyone
equally” (1991, p. 28).

Again, when we set out to describe the many possible varieties of moral
development, we have to acknowledge those individuals who develop Kantian
conceptions along with all the rest. How holding to a Kantian view of ethics
affects one’s sense of responsibility or one’s sense of being able to get ethical
guidance for one’s actions is in that respect a secondary question. But the exis-
tence of these drawbacks, and the fact that other moral conceptions have radically
different ways of addressing issues of moral guidance and responsibility, sug-
gests that we should neither restrict the moral domain as Kantians would urge us
to nor restrict ourselves to their view of moral rules and moral justification.

When we no longer accept a Kantian model of the study of moral develop-
ment, many possibilities open up. Is moral development simply a department of
cognitive development, as Kohlberg wanted to believe? Or must those who study
it deal with goals, values, emotions, personalities, and habits of action? Are the
issues around which people develop their moral orientations to be restricted to
our relationships with other people, to questions of rights and justice, or to
questions of caring for others? Or must we deal with self-conceptions, self-
understanding, and the ideals and aims that individuals set for themselves? Is
moral development the sort of thing that could have stages? Or are such developmental stages as make their appearance in moral development really stages in our understandings of ourselves, in the unfolding of our goals, and in the possible perspectives we can take on other individuals or on society at large?

What is the role of eudaimonism in all of this—is it to impose new limits of its own and to set up a new “most adequate” highest stage of development? Or is its function not to prescribe but rather to direct our concern toward the development of values and the self, to open up the moral domain, the aspects of the human being that must be considered in the study of moral development, and the space of possible moral conceptions whose development we must strive to account for?

Moral Development Is Personality Development

A most serious consequence of Kantian formalism and antipersonalism is the artificial split it has produced between moral development and personality development. Surely the development of the self, or moral character, is part of personality development. The deeper diremption between cognition and motivation, and the reluctance of cognitive developmentalists to trespass on territory claimed by Freudians and other personality theorists, has without a doubt contributed to this split (not that we recommend the use of Freudian methods or theories when moral developmentalists cross over into this previously forbidden territory—Christopher & Bickhard, 1990; Bickhard, 1992; Christopher, 1994). But the Kantian rejection of teleology has driven in a big wedge of its own. If the goals, desires, and interests of the phenomenal self have no relation to morality (except as temptations to be resisted or spurious incentives to do what ought to be done out of duty), if reason and appetite can never meet, then the development of the self and personality can be safely ignored.

In consequence, psychologists have typically not regarded identity (Erikson, 1950) as central to moral development. Indeed, it is said (Flanagan, 1991) that Kohlberg initially thought he could avoid Gilligan’s objections to his theory on the grounds that they pertained only to “ego development.” Moral developmentalists have pushed aside achievement motivation (nothing but the expedient gratification of appetites, of course). Concerns with personal growth, self-esteem, and self-assertion have been left to the psychotherapists (see Branden, 1969, 1994; Breggin, 1980; Maslow, 1968; and many others) despite their clear relevance to moral development. And the individualism inherent in much of clinical psychology clashes with the altruism and anti-personalism advocated by most moral developmentalists (see Waterman, 1981, for the individualist side of this dispute; Wallach & Wallach, 1983, for the altruist side). It is time that moral development and personality development were reintegrated: “Why might it not
be that in ethics our primary business is with our own characters and what kinds of persons we are to be and become?” (Veatch, 1980, p. 235).  

It is worth noting that the Aristotelian tradition (Aristotle, 325 BC/1941; Veatch, 1962) and other major moral traditions like Confucianism (Cua, 1989; Dien, 1982; Munro, 1969; Waley, 1938), stress the importance of acquiring the virtues as habits, as part of one’s personality, as “second nature.” Virtues from a non-Kantian standpoint are not rules emanating from a “rational” fragment of the self that knows nothing of personality or motivation. They are practical means to living the good life. Virtues like kindness, courage, integrity, and pride are aspects of personality and poorly understood ones at that (Flanagan, 1991). An account of moral development therefore needs to be situated in an account of the development of values and of the self.

Our preference is to undertake this inquiry within the interactivist framework for studying mental processes and their development. Among the virtues of this approach are the integration of cognition and motivation starting at the most primitive levels of knowing and interacting with the environment; the emphasis on goals and values (Bickhard, 1980a,b); and the rich array of constraints on development, including the hierarchical constraint that arises from the existence of a strictly ordered hierarchy of levels of knowing (Campbell & Bickhard, 1992).

From an interactivist standpoint (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986), even the simplest knowing system must have goals. And any system that can learn (that is, change how it interacts with its environment) will be capable of changing its goals or developing new ones. Goals can be related in two equally important ways. A goal can be instrumentally related to another goal, as a means to an end; one goal can make use of another. Or one goal can be related to another goal by satisfying it, or providing an instantiation of it. As we ascend to the second level in the hierarchy of knowing levels, we become capable of reflecting on goals at the lower level, not simply of thinking about them or becoming conscious of them, but also of forming goals about what kinds of goals we should have (that is, of constructing values). We become capable of having goals about goals, or as Taylor (1977) calls them, second-order desires. At the third level, we become capable of forming metavalues, or goals about the sorts of values we could and should have.

A value that develops with regard to a goal, or a metavalue that develops with regard to a value, is one possible explication or unfolding of the goals, values, and interactive organizations of the next lower knowing level. It is an unfolding of what was already implicit in the system. But it is only one among a number of possible unfoldings, and the unfolding of one value already implicit in the

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6 Our concern with moral character does not imply our endorsement of efforts by a former occupant of the Federal office of “Drug Czar” to promote “character education.” Thanks to Peter Kahn for alerting us to this possible misunderstanding.
person is no guarantee of its consistency with other values or goals. The resulting conflict may lead to attempts to change goals or ways of acting at lower knowing levels.

From the interactive standpoint, the self begins at level 1 as the goals and heuristics that the child develops to interact with the physical and social environments. Selfhood at this stage is implicit, a matter of being a self without knowing that self. At knowing-level 2, the child becomes capable of knowing that self, which involves much more than being able to use language for self-description. More broadly, the child can develop metastrategies for managing physical and social interactions in a wide range of situations. Such metastrategies presuppose various characterizations of the child, including characterizations as competent or incompetent, reliable or unreliable, lovable or unlovable, good or bad, but these characterizations are not normally objects of knowledge. The child has an identity but cannot know that identity or attempt to change it yet. At knowing-level 3, the child knows his or her self-representation, including much that was merely implicit at level 2, and can compare him- or herself to alternatives, pass explicit value judgments on himself or herself, and try to change in accordance with those judgments. That is, the child will undergo explicit identity-formation.

Among the values we can develop that cannot be acquired instrumentally are self-referential values, or values about the sorts of persons we are or would like to be. They cannot be acquired instrumentally because they are not merely about goals or ways of interacting at some lower stage—they are about the entire person. The value of being at peace with oneself is self-referential, for instance. There is no way to be deliberately at peace with oneself. What are traditionally considered virtues—pride, courage, integrity, kindness, justice (in the personal sense, not the political one), productivity, honor, prudence (practical wisdom)—all have a self-referential aspect.

Whatever the fate of this particular account, which in any case we have only sketched, there is no way to avoid something like it in the study of moral development. Goals and values are omnipresent in development. A concern with moral development requires us to attend to the unfolding of values in general and self-referential values in particular. Theories that adhere to the Kantian diremption between morality and values will never have the breadth nor the depth that are sorely needed.

Interactivism and eudaimonism turn out to have much in common: the centrality accorded to values in development, the refusal to turn aspects of the whole person into barbed-wire compartments labeled “reason” and “inclination,” the importance of self-reflection, higher-order knowledge, and self-referential values, and even the view (Veatch, 1962) that much of moral development is the acquisition of skill in dealing with life situations and not merely the application of articulated rules and principles. But of course nothing in the interactivist framework forces a belief in eudaimonism as the outcome of moral development.
An extremely wide array of values can arise from this sort of developmental process, with widely varying consequences for the individual. Values at the same level of knowing can contradict one another; values that contradict or deny goals at a lower level can unfold at a higher level. There is plenty of room for moral conflict and even regression within this framework—and there needs to be.

Moral Development Is Not Social Cognitive Development

Moral development as viewed from a post-Kantian perspective looks very different. The formalists, faithfully driving wedges between reason and appetite, have reduced moral development to cognitive development. But not just any kind of cognitive development will do—as an essentially other-regarding affair, moral cognition must be a species of social cognition. The altruists have been willing to open the door to feelings, but only those directly related to guilt, social understanding, or charitable action (the feeling of being bound by duty has so far escaped their attention). Hence it has been assumed that role-taking and empathy, which are crucial for understanding one’s relationship with others, are equally crucial to the development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; Hoffman, 1970; Damon, 1977; Selman, 1980) and to the development of “prosocial” thought and behavior (Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977).

We are now in a position to reject this facile equation. As eudaimonists and others have pointed out, not all moral problems are social. Whether to be honest with oneself or practice self-deception is not a social issue. Besides, a given level of social understanding can support a wide range of moral positions. Should we expect, for instance, that understanding others’ feelings and viewpoints better will necessarily lead a person to be more altruistic? The consequences of understanding another person’s feelings depend on what those feelings are and on one’s already developed values, including one’s conception of obligations toward others. Better understanding may lead us to help others or cooperate with them. It may even lead to sacrificing some greater value of our own for their sake. It may, on the other hand, lead to successful attempts to manipulate others. Or it may lead to rejecting their demands and refusing to support their projects. The consequences for moral development of a given instance of social development are widely varied.

Besides, social development is the development not just of isolated pieces of knowledge, or isolated competencies, but of the entire person (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Bickhard, 1992). As important as role-taking might be, moral developmentalists are not entitled to focus on it to such an extent that they ignore the full complex of ways that we relate to others—or to our physical environment, or to ourselves.

If we reorient the study of moral development to acknowledge the full breadth of the moral domain, and the full extent of the moral personalities and moral conceptions that can develop, we will have to acknowledge the multiplicity of paths by which these developments can occur. Major stages of moral develop-
ment; defined in terms of Kohlbergian cognitive structures, will have to fall by the wayside. This is not only because what develops must be defined in terms much broader than the structure of arguments in response to hypothetical dilemmas; it is because there are good reasons for questioning any conception of stages based on Piagetian cognitive structures (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986).

We suspect, in fact, that what pass for stages of moral development in the formalist approaches may really just be stages of role-taking and other forms of social understanding. Kohlberg, in his later writings, characterized his stages as different “sociomoral perspectives”; drop the “moral” and what we get are stages of possible perspectives on society. In other words, the positive legacy of Kohlberg’s years of labor may be Selman’s (1980) stages of social understanding. To corroborate our suspicions, when Turiel (1983a,b) tried to separate an understanding of social conventions from moral reasoning, he ended up with stages of thinking about social convention. There are no moral stages in his framework.

That is not to deny the possibility of stages in the development of values, or of identity, or in other related areas. Constraints on the processes of development can yield steps in a developmental sequence; the ascent of the knowing-levels hierarchy can yield full-blown major stages based on a principle of reflective abstraction (Campbell & Bickhard, 1992). Ironically, the aspect of moral development that most readily lends itself to a knowing-levels treatment is the development of thinking about one’s own moral values and those of others, provided, of course, that all rationally defensible metaethical criteria are admitted to the higher stages (see Moshman, 1995, for a moral stage theory of precisely this kind). Yet Kohlberg et al. (1983) took pains to exclude the development of “metaethical” considerations from the purview of their theory!

New Methods of Study

A redefinition of the moral domain, a reorientation toward the development of values and the self, and a reconception of moral development theory imply profound changes in our methods of empirical study. The favored devices for assessing moral reasoning are dilemmas about hypothetical situations: we tell people stories and ask them questions about them. The dilemmas of Kohlberg and his followers are limited to the narrow set of issues allowed by formalists—to political and legal justice. Under altruist influence, we might add dilemmas about altruistic acts (although we must also score them fairly). Under Gilligan’s influence, we might try to ensure that matters of caring and response get covered, and we might even expand our coverage to interviews about conceptions of morality or about real-life moral problems. We might even be so bold as to include personal moral issues in our interviews. But there is alot more to moral development than the kinds of reasoning that can be exhibited in responses to interview questions. Flanagan (1991) is appropriately skeptical, we think, of basing assessments of moral development exclusively on “talk.”

Our ways of being, the goals and heuristics involved in managing our inter-
actions with others, our enduring dispositions, and our tangled hierarchies of values, are not going to manifest themselves so easily in the course of interviews. Besides, morality is an area in which many people experience inner conflicts. The moral language that they know and the articulated moral teachings that they have heard usually express the received view of morality within their culture. If their practices and their unstated moral beliefs are substantially at variance with the moral language they have been taught, they may not be able to articulate these beliefs effectively on hypothetical dilemmas.

Eudaimonistic philosophers (Aristotle, 325 BC/1941; Veatch, 1962; Nussbaum, 1990a,b) have often sought to illustrate their conception of morality by pointing to the virtues and flaws of historical figures or characters in fiction. To test our ideas about the principles and major constraints in moral development, we are compelled to examine whole lives, or major portions of them, in context. We will need to engage in the comparative biography of moral character, in much the same way that Gardner (1993) has used case studies to compare and contrast different kinds of creativity. (These days a concern with narratives, including biographical ones, might seem to be an invitation to take the hermeneutical route. That is not our intention. Although we are sympathetic with contemporary hermeneutics on a number of issues, such as the context-dependency of language, historicity in development, and the primacy of practical activity as a form of knowledge, we part company when hermeneuticists uncritically accept a positivist vision of science or when they promote a metaphysics of linguistic idealism—see Campbell & Bickhard, 1986. The importance of language notwithstanding, human beings do not begin their lives as members of a language community, and human life is not linguistically constituted.)

Our survey of alternatives is hardly exhaustive, in any case. Moral development research will move in many directions once it bursts the confines of Kantianism.

Rethinking Moral Development: Hazards and Opportunities

To an outside observer, concerned as nearly everyone is about moral issues, but not enmeshed in the intricacies and arcana of moral development research, the field of moral development is liable to appear ingrown, stale, and circumscribed. The dilemmas, the scoring systems, the correlated measures of empathy and sympathy and helping behavior have taken over as objects of study in place of the moral personality, thought, and behavior of developing individuals. Researchers seem to have lost touch with the vital issues that once impelled them to study moral development. Such malaise is a signal that researchers ought to be focusing on something besides designing the next empirical study or fending off local criticisms of the last one. It is time to rethink the entire field and the directions in which research might be pursued. If successful, our arguments may get the process started; we do not pretend to know where the new directions will lead.
But a survey of past experience should alert us to a serious hazard, to be avoided in the future. We must avoid once again being captured by our preferred moral philosophy. No one moral conception can be allowed to fence in the moral domain, or tie blinders around our vision of moral development. No matter how attractive or powerful our philosophical arguments might be, we must acknowledge and seek to understand how people arrive at opposed moral conceptions. This critique has focused on Kant’s legacy because it currently dominates the study of moral development. Eudaimonism has the advantage of being far more inclusive than Kantianism. But the same hazards could be posed by a research program inspired by eudaimonism, Buddhism, or Confucianism.

One syndrome of moral orthodoxy that we should know how to guard against is the search for a highest, “most adequate” stage of development that just happens to embody our own conception. It is not just the study of moral development that has fallen prey to this error: Philosophocentrism is rampant in conceptions of advanced or “postformal” stages of epistemological thinking, religious faith, everyday problem-solving, and so on. Why this happens should not be mysterious. There is always egocentrism at one’s highest stage of development. There is always the temptation to assume that one’s own philosophical position is a product of more advanced reasoning than the positions one rejects (Campbell & Bickhard, 1986). At least knowing about egocentrism gives us some chance of guarding against this error.

A broader perspective on moral development reveals both arduous challenges and unsuspected opportunities. A successful research program will have to account for the development of all of the wide variety of moral views that are actually found somewhere, but without lapsing into environmental determinism or moral relativism. It will have to account not only for eudaimonism, Kantianism, and Confucianism, but for moral traditions and practices radically different from any of these. To consider a possibility as yet unmentioned, it will have to meet Harré’s (1984) challenge to account for the development of moralities based on honor, like the 19th century British code of the perfect gentleman or the 16th century Japanese military code of *bushido*. It will have to deal with honor moralities that are usually regarded as noble, like that of Cyrano de Bergerac, as well as honor moralities that are normally considered depraved, like those of Mafiosi and inner city youth gangs (for more on this issue, see Christopher, in press).

An adequate research program in moral development, then, will have to study the development of values and of the self. The scope of its inquiry will have to be broadened to include the full range of moral problems, of moral personality types, and of mature moral conceptions. Eudaimonism offers some guidance in this quest. It challenges the narrowness of existing conceptions of moral development. It is consistent with our schematic understanding of the way values unfold and of the role of reflective abstraction in the course of development. It offers some hypotheses about the internal consistency of different sets of moral
values and their compatibility with human flourishing. But neither eudaimonism nor any other moral philosophy can set itself up as the sole arbiter of what counts as a moral conception or of what level or kind of moral development is most advanced.

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