

JONATHAN HAIDT'S MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY AND THE INTERACTIVIST ONTOLOGY OF THE PERSON

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HAIDT: BACKGROUND AND INFLUENCES

Majored in philosophy at Yale

- “I studied philosophy in college, hoping to figure out the meaning of life.” (2012, p. 4)

Ph. D. in psychology from the University of Pennsylvania (1992)

- Came under the influence of “Pennsylvania nativism”
- Worked with Paul Rozin in research on disgust

Postdoctoral fellowship at University of Chicago

- Under cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder
- Haidt spent time in Bhubaneswar; he credits the experience with making him appreciative of moral foundations

SHWEDER'S THREE ETHICAL SYSTEMS

Autonomy

Community

Divinity

Like Shweder, Haidt reacted sharply against Elliot Turiel's theory of moral, conventional, and personal domains

Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) used a Shwederian system to analyze participants' justifications

But Haidt still has more in common with Turiel than he may realize

CAREER

Joined the Psychology Department at the University of Virginia in 1995

- Like some present or former UVA colleagues—such as Daniel Wegner and Tim Wilson—emphasizes unconscious pattern recognition and deemphasizes conscious decision making

Early research on negative moral emotions such as: disgust, shame, and vengeance

- Under the influence of the Positive Psychology movement;

Later research focused on positive moral emotions, such as: admiration, awe, and moral elevation

Now Moral Foundations Theory is his main focus

Moved to New York University in 2012

TURIEL'S REACTION TO KOHLBERG

Moral issues are as Lawrence Kohlberg defines them: rights, justice, equality, reciprocity

Moral rules are (largely) as Kohlberg defines them—and as Kant defined them before him (minus duties to self)

But what's developing through stages is no longer moral reasoning

STAGES OF THINKING ABOUT SOCIAL CONVENTIONS

- 1. Describe uniform behavior (ages 6-7)**
- 2. Following conventions is arbitrary:
“everyone does it” isn’t a good reason to
do it (ages 8-9)**
- 3. Upholding the rule system (arbitrary,
changeable, expected by authorities) (ages
10-11)**
- 4. Reject conventions as rules: are just
social expectations (ages 12-13)**

SOCIAL CONVENTION STAGES CONT.

5. Conventions are vital norms of a social system with fixed roles and a static hierarchy (ages 14-15)

6. Conventions are just societal standards that have become customary through use (ages 16-17)

7. Conventions are shared knowledge that serve the function of facilitating social interactions (ages 18-25)

Each even-numbered stage is a *negation* of the previous odd-numbered stage

DOMAIN DISTINCTIONS

Turiel's view is usually called "*domain theory*"

***Morality* is one social domain**

***Social convention* is another**

***Prudential or "personal"* concerns are another**

Domains are distinct *early in development*

There is *never heteronomy* (dependence on commandments from external authority) in the moral domain (as narrowly defined)

Getting rid of a heteronomous stages separates Turiel from Piaget and Kohlberg (but not from Kant)

DOMAIN DISTINCTIONS SO EARLY?

Larry Nucci and Elliot Turiel (1978)

Observations in preschools

**How do 3, 4, and 5-year-olds react to
“moral” and “conventional”
transgressions?**

VIOLATIONS OF MORAL RULES

Example: Tommy wants a toy Suzy is playing with. Suzy doesn't want to give the toy to Tommy. Tommy hits Suzy.

Act has “intrinsic consequences”; does harm to another person or is injurious to the person's welfare

Children usually react, sometimes try to intervene

Talk about consequences: “You hurt Suzy.”

Try to comfort the victim

Don't talk about hitting being against rules (no “rule contingency”)

VIOLATIONS OF SOCIAL CONVENTIONS

For instance, Freddy doesn't answer when he comes in the door and the teacher says "Hi, Freddy"

Adults respond; children usually don't.

Teachers talk about rules and about order in the school.

Even young children often say such actions would be OK if there were no rule against them.

PRUDENTIAL OR PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS

***Personal* matters: playing with a friend you're not supposed to play with; wearing long hair (if a boy); watching TV on a sunny day**

Would not be “wrong in the absence of a rule”

Should be the person's own business

***Prudential* matters include health or safety issues**

MORAL UNDERSTANDING *DOESN'T DEVELOP*

Kids think that lying, hitting, and stealing are wrong at age 3

Core judgments of what would be wrong “without a rule” don’t change with age

Conventional and personal matters are categorized the same way from 2nd grade on up

SOME PROBLEMS FOR DOMAINS THEORY

Are these three domains *the only ones*?

Is the theory *legalistic* (does it reduce moral issues to issues of rights or law?)

Do some people *include matters besides rights and justice* in the moral domain?

A CROSS-CULTURAL COUNTEREXAMPLE

Shweder, Mahapatra, and Miller (1987)

Interviews in Bhubaneswar, India

**Participants rated the sinfulness of 40
actions**

**Some were morally relevant in Turiel's
sense: committing murder, stealing,
cheating customers (perhaps also, not
helping the poor)**

SINS

Others are not considered moral issues by Turiel

- Violating codes of behavior for people in mourning
- For widows
- For menstruating women, etc.

THE WORST SIN

An eldest son gets his hair cut and eats a chicken the day after his father dies

WHY?

**Eating meat is bad for other sentient beings
and bad for your karma**

**Allowing hair to grow while in mourning
absorbs spiritual pollution from the death
in your family**

**The eldest son is his family's primary
representative after the father dies**

WHAT DOMAIN IS THAT?

“Unearthly-belief-mediated”

“God’s word”

OTHER ISSUES

Could you be sure that an action or practice is immoral but not believe there should be a law against it?

Turiel calls these cases “anomalous”

What might be “anomalous” for many Americans?

STILL OTHER ISSUES

Turiel believes that “informational assumptions” about whether a fetus is a human being (etc.) play a role in people’s judgments

But moral judgments are entirely distinct from such factual judgments

EPICYCLES

The moral domain can be defined the same for everyone in every culture without “moral variation”

But only if much of the weight is carried by *other domains* of consideration

- And extra domains can be added to the theory as needed

And only if *people’s own ideas* of what is a moral issue are discounted

ENTER MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

For about the last ten years, Haidt has been developing and testing a theory about the foundations of human morality

- The number is subject to revision: presently there are six foundations
- Shweder's theory (and the theory implied by Haidt's dissertation work) proposed *three* moral systems
- For its first several years, MFT was a *five*-foundation theory
- Other possible foundations are under consideration

DESCRIPTIVE AIM OF MORAL FOUNDATIONS THEORY

Aims to explain how morality varies across cultures, within limits set by the humanly possible foundations for it

- It also aims to explain how moral systems vary *within* cultures

Haidt (2012) rejects “moral monism,” likening it to dining all the time at the “one taste restaurant”

AFFECT, CULTURE, AND MORALITY, OR IS IT WRONG TO EAT YOUR DOG?

Haidt's dissertation research

Published as Haidt, Koller, & Dias (1993)

- Appeared in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*
- This led to its being overlooked by moral developmentalists for several years

UNDERLYING QUESTIONS

What do people treat as *moral issues*?

Does the *domain of morality* vary across cultures?

Do concerns about *harm* exhaust the moral domain for all cultures?

Do some cultures regard disgusting or disrespectful actions as violations of moral rules, even though no one else is (or could plausibly be) harmed by them?

CULTURAL CONTRASTS

**Three locations in the United States and Brazil
(Philadelphia, Porto Alegre, and Recife)**

**All three cities are similar in size; Porto Alegre is
wealthier and more “Westernized” than Recife**

**The key stories were chosen because they were
likely to offend or “feel wrong” even when there
was no victim**

**Who, if anyone, would respond by endorsing
interference with the person’s actions and by
judging the actions to be universally wrong?**

THE SAMPLE

In each of the three cities, four groups of 30 subjects were interviewed: high SES adults (college students); high SES children; low SES adults; low SES children.

Average age for children was 11; adults were in their early 20s

All groups were approximately balanced for gender

The racial composition of the groups reflected the demographics of race and class in each city

STORIES THAT EXEMPLIFY TURIEL'S MORAL AND CONVENTIONAL DOMAINS

A girl wants to use a swing, so she pushes a boy off it and hurts him (Violation of a moral rule)

A boy wears regular clothes to school, even though the school requires students to wear a uniform (Violation of a social convention)

A man eats all his food with his hands, in public and in private—after washing them (Violation of a social convention)

These three stories were taken from Davidson, Turiel, and Black (1983)

STORIES INVOLVING OFFENSE, BUT NOT HARM

An actor does something likely to be considered disrespectful, without intending harm or actually harming others

- Cutting up an old flag and using the pieces to clean the bathroom
- Failing to keep a promise to visit his or her mother's grave

STORIES INVOLVING OFFENSE, BUT NOT HARM

An actor eats something or engages in a sexual practice likely to elicit disgust

- Cooking and eating the family dog after it was run over by a car
- A brother and sister secretly kissing (this was not given to low-SES kids in Philadelphia; replaced with story about a child bingeing and purging on candy)
- A man having sexual intercourse with a raw chicken before cooking and eating it
 - This item was not given to children anywhere

HARM AND OFFENSE CHECKS

Each participant was asked whether the stories involved *harm* to the actor, or to the others

Each participant was asked whether the actions described in the story *bothered* him or her

Some participants claimed to find harm in the stories intended to be offensive

Some claimed not to be bothered by stories intended to be offensive (e.g., cutting up a flag into rags)

“MORALIZING”

Haidt’s criteria for treating an issue as moral were derived from Elliot Turiel’s theory

Universalizing: is the action wrong, regardless of whether it’s considered OK in a given culture?

Interference: should the actor be stopped from doing the action, or punished for doing it/

Consistent moralizing: for Haidt, this is judging that it’s always wrong and the person should be stopped from doing it

REACTIONS

Most high-SES Philadelphians judged the harmless-offensive stories to involve nonmoral conventions, so the actions shouldn't be interfered with

Most low-SES Recifeans universalized their judgments and endorsed interference with the actions

CHILDREN AND ADULTS

68% of children said they would not like it or would be bothered if they witnessed any of the harmless actions

Children were more likely than adults to find stories offensive and to call for punishment or interference

Children “universalized” 69% of the harmless offensive cases (saying the action would be wrong whether it was considered OK in that culture or not) while the adults universalized only 39%

FOUR PATTERNS OF REACTION TO THE OFFENSIVE BUT HARMLESS STORIES

- **Moralizing**
- **Enforceable-Conventional**
- **“Personal Morality”**
- **Permissive**

PERMISSIVENESS AND MORALIZING

High-SES adults (college students in Philadelphia, Porto Alegre, and Recife) and **high-SES children in Philadelphia** tended to treat the offensive but harmless acts as “mere” violations of social conventions or exercises of personal choice

All of the low-SES groups (plus **high-SES children in Recife**) tended to treat the offensive but harmless acts as universally wrong and deserving of interference or punishment

In the Permissive groups, Harm was more highly correlated than Bother with universalizing and interference

In the Moralizing groups, *Bother was more highly correlated than Harm* with universalizing and interference

WEIRDNESS

There was a huge effect of social class on moral judgment

- It was bigger than Haidt had anticipated

Brazilian college students had more in common with college students in Philadelphia than with their neighbors in Brazil

WEIRD: Western, **E**ducated, **I**ndustrialized, **R**ich, and **D**emocratic

Haidt concludes that Turiel's theory of three domains *holds only for WEIRD people*

The domain of morality *does* appear to vary cross-culturally

SIX MORAL FOUNDATIONS

Care/harm

Fairness/cheating

Liberty/oppression

Loyalty/betrayal

Authority/subversion

Sanctity/degradation

CARE/HARM

In primate species offspring suffering can be detected by the mother

In humans this ability to detect has extended to all other human beings (and perhaps beyond)

Those who stop harm from being done reap approval

Hence the virtues of kindness and compassion

FAIRNESS/CHEATING

Ultimately stems from alliance formation and cooperation in primates

Promotes the development of anger, guilt, gratitude

Leads to virtues of fairness and justice

Proportionality or the law of Karma is an instance of fairness

Haidt no longer classifies equality as fairness

LIBERTY/OPPRESSION

The most recent addition to the theory

Haidt's recent work in political psychology led to this addition

Traces back to resistance among primates to excessive dominance or aggression

“Don't Tread on Me” is a conservative expression

“No Logo” is a Left-wing expression

LOYALTY/BETRAYAL

From living in kin-based groups

Led to emotions of trusting, recognizing, and cooperating with members

Value accorded to those who sacrifice for the group

Cultures develop loyalty, patriotism, heroism

AUTHORITY/ SUBVERSION

Hierarchical social structure

Dominant males and females get perquisites but are expected to provide protection

Respect and admiration toward authority figures

Virtues related to subordination

SANCTITY/ DEGRADATION

Human disgust reactions reject potentially contaminated food

Disgust can extend to other human beings and their actions

Concerns with ritual purity develop

HAIDT'S POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (VERSION 1.0)

Asked to identify political views on 7-point scale


- “Strongly liberal” to “strongly conservative”

Asked 15 questions concerning moral judgments

Strong liberals put most weight on care and fairness

Strong conservatives put roughly equal importance on all of the five foundations then in use

RESULTS



HAIDT AND TURIEL

Like Shweder, Haidt does not accept Kohlberg and Turiel's dismissal of religion as morally irrelevant

About half of *The Righteous Mind* is concerned with human "groupishness" and religion's key role in it

"Religions are morality's exoskeletons" (p. 269)

Oddly, Émile Durkheim is the thinker most often cited in *The Righteous Mind*, ranked right up there with Charles Darwin, yet Haidt shows no recognition either of Piaget's positive interest in Durkheim—or of his reaction against Durkheim's prescriptions for moral education

DOMAINS IN HAIDT AND TURIEL

Haidt is prone to add domains—but these are all deemed relevant, so his additions are not epicyclic

However, Haidt considers Turiel the prime exponent of the “cognitive developmental point of view”

He uses assimilation and accommodation in his analysis of awe (p. 228), without any apparent awareness of the origin of these notions

Yet Turiel’s moral and personal domains are not subject to any significant qualitative change once established

Neither are Haidt’s care, fairness, liberty, loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations

MORALITY AND POLITICS

Haidt shares Turiel's assumption that morality translates directly into political attitudes: if you think it's immoral, you'll think it ought to be prohibited by law

He does waver in the direction of a two-layer theory, specifically involving utilitarianism at the political level:

“But when we talk about making laws and implementing public policies in Western democracies that contain some degree of ethnic and moral diversity, then I think there is no compelling alternative to utilitarianism.” (p. 272)

Having utterly trashed utilitarianism as a moral conception, how does Haidt propose to rehabilitate it as a legal or political conception?

If not, how will he deal with Turiel's “anomalous” cases?

ANTI- DEVELOPMENTALISM

Turiel implies, through indifference to the developmental questions, that the moral domain is innate in human beings

Haidt explicitly treats all of his domains as innate

However, the moral weight given to each is a matter of acculturation and (presumably) also of individual development

Pennsylvania nativism in 22 words:

“But when developmental psychologists invented ways to look into infant minds, they found a great deal of writing already on that slate.” (p. 63)

MASSIVELY MODULAR EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

Haidt endorses a “massively modular” form of nativism

The ontology of this is unclear, though Haidt cautions that is not Fodorian, but Sperberian (the latter allowing for modules for acquiring modules)

Haidtian moral foundations can't be “informationally encapsulated”—or more than one of them could not contribute to the same person's moral judgments and reactions

Was there a single EEA, or are “moral matrices” subject to biological evolution?

“I don't think evolution can create a new mental module from scratch in just 12,000 years, but I can see no reason why existing features—such as the six [moral] foundations ... or the tendency to feel shame—would not be tweaked if conditions changed and then stayed stable for a thousand years.” (p. 216)

CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS

Haidt relies on a binary contrast between controlled and automatic, conscious and unconscious processes

And insists that unconscious processes are much more powerful

The unconscious is an elephant, the conscious mind is a rider

**“And psychopaths have normal conscious, “strategic” mind; they lack normal unconscious reactions to need, suffering, or indignity in others” (2012, p. 63);
psychopaths reason but don’t feel (p. 70)**

Unconscious processes are the dog, conscious processes are the tail

LACK OF INTEREST IN MORAL REASONING

Haidt is uninterested in advances in moral reasoning

Turiel already deemphasized changes in moral reasoning, in favor of “coordination” among domains

Reasoning is peripheral to Haidt’s own conception of morality (Hume is his favorite moral philosopher; attributing a significant role to reason in morality is Platonic)

Haidt reduces moral reasoning to rationalization for “instinctual” reactions

“But for nonscientists, there is no such thing as a study you must believe.” (p. 85)

“The function of those [religious] beliefs and practices is to create a community. Often our beliefs are post hoc constructions designed to justify what we’ve just done, or to support the groups we belong to.” (pp. 250-251)

GLAUCON WAS RIGHT

“I’ve argued that Glaucon was right and that we care more about *looking* good than about truly *being* good. Intuitions come first, *strategic* reasoning second. We lie, cheat, and cut ethical corners often when we think we can get away with it, and then we use our moral thinking to manage our reputations and justify ourselves to others. We believe our own post hoc reasoning so thoroughly that that we end up self-righteously convinced of our own virtue.” (p. 190)

VALUE IS NOT A CENTRAL CONCEPT

Values are no more a part of Haidt's theory than they were of Kohlberg's or Turiel's

WHERE VALUE IS A CENTRAL CONCEPT: ONTOLOGY OF GOALS

Any goal-directed system operates according to this principle

While in state S , to move closer to goal G , under input conditions I : emit output O , and follow the transition to state $S+1$

At root, goals have to be definable *internally*

PHYSICAL AND FUNCTIONAL

The second-level system (as physically instantiated) can know aspects of the first level

Once enough interesting stuff is known at the second level, a third level may emerge (functionally) from which aspects of the second level are known

The third level requires no special physical instantiation

Further functional emergence: once aspects of Level N-1 are in place, these may become known by Level N

REFLECTIVE ABSTRACTION, STAGES, NO FIXED UPPER LIMIT

Reflective abstraction (roughly equivalent to Piaget's idea of *reflecting* abstraction) is what gets the knower from Level N-1 to Level N

Major developmental stages can be defined in terms of levels of knowing


- Not subroutine hierarchies
- Not Piagetian groupings and lattices

There is no fixed upper limit on levels of knowing

- Roughly as with Piaget's *operations to the n^{th} power*

Campbell and Bickhard, *Knowing levels and developmental stages* (1986)

GREEN AND WHITE BOXES



GOALS UP THROUGH THE LEVELS OF KNOWING

Simple goals at Level 1

**Goals about goals (metagoals, values) at Level
2**

Values about values (metavalues) at Level 3

**Metavalues about metavalues (e.g., evaluations
of ethical systems) at Level 4**

THE SELF UP THROUGH THE LEVELS OF KNOWING

Being a self but not having a self at Level 1

Having a self but not an identity at Level 2

**Having an identity (comparing possible ways
our selves might be) at Level 3**

**Meta-identity or explicit constraints on identity
at Level 4**

VICE UP THROUGH THE LEVELS

Harmful or maladaptive habits and practices at Level 1

Metahabits: Judgments about harmful practices (and practices for developing harmful practices) at Level 2

Metametahabits: Judgments about harmful metapactices (and practices for developing harmful metapactices) at Level 3

Judgments about harmful metametapactices (etc.) at Level 4

LEVEL 1

Birth through age 4 in human beings

Interactive practice (much of which is social) and “being-in-the-world” (Heidegger)

Goals acquired and pursued (e.g., getting Mommy to laugh) are rich with implications

Most implications are not themselves known or represented (e.g., relaxing tension within the family system)

That is, most implications are implicit

LEVEL 2

2nd level starts at age 3 ½ or 4 (judging from data on knowing about knowledge and belief)

Metagoals: goals about which goals to have

Values at Level 2 are instantiated in goals at Level 1

LEVEL 2 METAGOALS

A child can recognize at Level 2 that she doesn't want to quit on a number problem until she gets the answer

Can formulate a metagoal of not quitting on a number problem until she gets it right

The metagoal subsumes existing goals

It directs the formation of further goals at Level 1

LEVEL 2 METAGOALS

Now it does make sense to say that the child *is conscientious*

It doesn't make sense to say that the child *values conscientiousness...*

LEVEL 3 METAVALUES

At Level 3, conscientiousness can be explicitly valued and made part of a person's identity

One person's conscientiousness can be compared against other possible ways to be

The person can seek to construct new Level 2 values to implement the metavalue

The person's identity incorporates or implies a system of metavalues

LEVEL 4

Metavalues about (systems of) metavalues

Classifying and choosing between entire ethical systems

Judging the arguments for such systems

Moral *philosophy* is (nearly all) done at Level 4

Moral *decisions* are (virtually) never made at Level 4

LEVEL 4

METAMETAVALUES

Understanding and comparing ethical systems

Conscientiousness is regarded in some systems as a virtue, which is itself necessary for *eudaimonia*

It may be considered morally irrelevant in other systems (or valued in these only if put in service of some other ends)

A Level 4 thinker may put forward a brief for conscientiousness as a virtue—and against views that don't accord it that status

INSTANTIATION

Relations of instantiation run down the knowing levels

A metametavalue at Level 4 is multiply instantiated in metavalues at Level 3

A metavalue at Level 3 is multiply instantiated in values at Level 2

INSTANTIATIONS MAY CONFLICT

A value at Level 2 is multiply instantiated in goals at Level 1

Instantiations may conflict in varying degrees with what they instantiate

I may believe that I should always stand up for myself in social situations (Level 3)

Yet my Level 2 values include not offending certain kinds of people on certain issues

INSTANTIATIONS MAY FURTHER CONFLICT

And my Level 1 goals may often include avoiding certain kinds of anticipated reactions from this person or that

OSCILLATING CONFLICT

Volition at one level may not be in harmony with volition at a higher level, and so *one may be moved to do X and simultaneously value someone's preventing the doing of X*. Indeed, the direction of desires can continue to oscillate at successively higher levels. Consider the prude who is troubled by his lascivious desires and wishes to quell them. Suppose that he becomes a recipient of the largesse of the Sexual Revolution such that he now wishes to put his prudery behind him, all the better to wallow in his instinctive desires. In such a case, a third-order desire attempts to countermand a second-order desire which itself wars against a first-order desire. It seems possible that the prude might then develop a fourth-order desire that goes against the third, and so on.

—Loren Lomasky, *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community* (1987), p. 59 [my italics]

GOAL CONFLICT

Goal conflict is possible *between levels*

The correct resolution of such a conflict is not necessarily in favor of the higher-level goal

Goal conflict is possible *within a level*

Recognizing the implications of particular goal selections usually requires further development

There is no need to reify goal conflict into permanent warring subsystems, fractions of the self, or parts of the soul

VALUE, VIRTUE, AND SELF

It isn't merely that goals/values, good habits/virtues, bad habits/vices, and self/identity develop through analogous stages

From an interactivist point of view, moral development *is* virtue and vice development *is* self development

Self-definitions that exclude or downgrade morality (such as an Eriksonian “negative identity”) are (severe) instances of goal conflict, overtly expressed at Level 3

Paralyzing self-condemnation after a serious moral lapse (Blasi calls this “self-inconsistency”) is a severe type of goal conflict, also overtly expressed at Level 3

TRAITS AND TRAIT TROUBLES

Virtues and vices are widely thought to be *traits*

The trait idea has had its ups and downs over the last 100 years

- 1920s: Behaviorism rejected traits; “behavior is under the control of the stimulus”
- 1930s: Henry Murray’s “needs” (nAch; nInf; etc.)
- 1960s: Walter Mischel and other attribution theorists rejected traits again
- 1980s: Costa and McCrae’s 5 factor personality test and NEO-AC theory revived them
- 2000s: Values in Action classification uses traits while skirting the questions about them

Traits are supposed to be *stable, domain-general, and context-independent*

WHERE ARE THE TRAITS?

What is empirical evidence for particular virtues or vices?

Is honesty a domain-general, context-independent, stable attribute of a person?

- Courage?
- Benevolence?

Is dishonesty a domain-general, context-independent, stable attribute of a person?

- Cowardice?
- Malevolence?

Hartshorne, May, Maller, and Shuttleworth (1928-1930) concluded that there are different patterns of cheating and not cheating under conditions where cheating is possible

Kohlberg accepted Hartshorne et al.'s critique, and derided non-rule-based moralities as a “bag of virtues”

FROM TRAITS TO INVARIANTS

One level of response to Hartshorne and May (or to later skeptics about traits like Mischel) is to point out that there are moderate correlations (e.g., between generous behavior in one relevant situation and in another)

But this doesn't explain why the correlations aren't higher

And it doesn't explain what's going on underlyingly

To do that, psychologists need to replace substantial traits with process invariants of some kind

OK, WHERE ARE THE INVARIANTS?

A psychologically adequate conception of virtue and vice needs to be *process-oriented*

Needs to include *goals and values*

Needs to acknowledge the course of development

- Are traits of “temperament” in babies stable?
- Is there a direct path from the condition of your primary attachment to your personality later in life?

The invariants may be across the person at a given time, or in the person over time

HAIDTIAN SOURCES

Haidt, J. (2012). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion*. New York: Pantheon.

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